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FINANCIAL MARKET BOTTLENECKS 
AND THE “OPENNESS” MANDATE 
 
FELIX B. CHANG † 
Financial market infrastructures (“FMIs”), which facilitate 
the execution of financial transactions, exhibit such strong 
economies of scale that they are natural monopolies. In each 
market, production is controlled by a few dominant players. 
Federal courts have traditionally checked the abuses of natural 
monopolies under the Sherman Act. Yet recent Supreme Court 
decisions have reined in the role of antitrust in regulated 
industries, where administrative bodies set and enforce standards. 
To this effect, financial regulations require certain FMIs to grant 
open, nondiscriminatory access to users. 
This Article argues that weak “openness” regulations must 
be buttressed by their antitrust counterpart—specifically, the 
essential facilities doctrine, which enables an excluded user to sue 
for wrongful denial of access to an FMI. 
This Article situates FMIs at the intersection of four seismic 
trends. First, the role of FMIs as a mitigant of systemic risk renders 
their growth inevitable. Second, open access has become 
fashionable in the regulation of other natural monopolies (e.g., net 
neutrality rules), but this approach requires precise standards. 
Third, essential facilities can supplement weak open access 
regulations, but the doctrine was nearly dismantled by the 
Supreme Court a decade ago. Finally, the balance between 
antitrust and regulation is due to be reset, and the next move will 
likely come from FMIs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Financial intermediaries—entities such as banks which serve 
as conduits between investors and investment—benefit from 
economies of scale. The larger an intermediary is, the cheaper its 
services will be, which in turn attracts more customers.
1
 A subset of 
financial intermediaries known as financial market infrastructures 
(“FMIs”) exhibits such strong economies of scale that they are 
natural monopolies—monopolies which arise because one producer 
can serve the market more efficiently than multiple producers.
2
 
 
1 RICHARD SCOTT CARNEY ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 39-40 (2013). 
2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 
123-24 (1971); Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly, 
Deregulation, and Intellectual Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1138–39 
(2008). 
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FMIs facilitate the execution of financial transactions.
3
 Like 
other natural monopolies, FMIs dominate the markets that they 
serve. For example, two credit card networks finance the lion’s share 
of consumer transactions,
4
 while SWIFT is the primary payment 
messaging system among banks.
5
 
Prior to the financial crisis, little attention was paid to FMIs. 
They had been eclipsed by more glamorous intermediaries such as 
banks and hedge funds. Now, financial reform laws have catapulted 
one type of FMI—derivatives clearinghouses—from obscurity to 
prominence.
6
 A clearinghouse guarantees the trading activity of its 
members.
7
 If a member cannot honor its obligations to the other 
party in a trade, the clearinghouse will step in.
8
 And if all trading 
activity in the derivatives markets is backstopped by large, well-
funded clearinghouses, then the default of one member is less likely 
to transmit contagion throughout the financial system.
9
 
Lawmakers in the world’s biggest financial markets have 
built risk management systems around derivatives clearinghouses. 
For instance, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) directs approximately $700 trillion in 
derivatives trades toward a handful of clearinghouses for 
processing.
10
 Armed with this mandate and strong economies of 
scale, clearinghouses have the propensity to distort competition.
11
 
 
3 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & OICU-IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL 
MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES (2012), available at http://perma.cc/Z2DB-JPWP; 
Federal Reserve, Oversight of Key Financial Market Infrastructures (2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/over_about.htm. 
4 In 2013, Visa controlled 49.3% of the market share, Mastercard 30.8%, 
Discover 10.7%, and American Express 9.2%. CardHub, Market Share by Credit 
Card Network, http://www.cardhub.com/edu/market-share-by-credit-card-
network/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). See also Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The 
Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1321, 1327 
(2008). 
5 SWIFT, Company Information, 
http://www.swift.com/about_swift/company_information/company_informa
tion (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
6 Derivatives are financial instruments whose values fluctuate on the basis of 
other variables, such as interest rates, stock prices, and even the weather. See 
Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 681–83 (2002). For the risks of derivatives, see Arthur 
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
215, 337-73 (2002). 
7 Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 
101 GEO. L.J. 387, 408-13 (2013). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 410.  
10 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 8302(d)(1) 
(2012). This number corresponds to the notional (or contract) value of the 
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For all the attention paid to clearinghouses, little has been 
made of their natural monopoly characteristics. Antitrust 
considerations occupy only a small corner of Dodd-Frank,
12
 and with 
few exceptions,
13
 scholars have not taken up the effects on 
competition of large clearinghouses. This is not surprising; in the 
aftermath of a crisis, industry and regulators are far too consumed 
with the preservation of markets. But it would be a mistake to ignore 
the antitrust implications of clearinghouses, because these entities sit 
at the intersection of four seismic legal trends. 
First, the primacy placed upon clearinghouses as a mitigant of 
systemic risk renders their growth and consolidation inevitable. A 
clearinghouse must be big if it is to buffer markets from the shock of 
large-scale defaults.
14
 Yet if mismanaged, a large clearinghouse 
becomes a bottleneck that stifles competition. Specifically, Dodd-
Frank requires derivatives trades to run through clearinghouses (the 
bottleneck facility).
15
 If a clearinghouse denies membership to 
certain applicants, then those applicants will be unable to operate and 
compete as traders of derivatives instruments.
16
 
Second, the typical regulatory response to bottlenecks is a 
requirement of open, nondiscriminatory access. Dodd-Frank features 
such a requirement.
17
 In other areas where bottlenecks prevail, open 
access rules are also the go-to solution. For instance, in 
telecommunications, where internet service providers deliver web 
content to consumers, scholars have pushed for “net neutrality” rules 
that would restrict the ability of these providers to fast-track the 
content of favored websites.
18
 In discrimination law, Joseph Fishkin 
 
over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives markets. See Bank for Int’l Settlements, 
Derivatives Statistics, tbl. 19 (Sept. 14, 2014), http://perma.cc/877H-
SL8C?type=pdf. 
11 See infra Section II.B. 
12 See infra Section III.B. 
13 See Michael Greenberger, Diversifying Clearinghouse Ownership in Order to 
Safeguard Free and Open Access to the Derivatives Clearing Market, 18 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 245 (2013). 
14 Felix B. Chang, The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks and Clearinghouses under 
Regulation, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 101, 130-33 (2014). 
15 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1a(15); 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3. 
16 See infra Section II.B. This maneuver would be a classic form of vertical 
exclusion. Vertical exclusion has inspired generations of controversy, though 
the latest trend seems to be a validation of scholars who view this type of 
exclusion as harmful. See infra text accompanying notes 66-74. One such 
scholar, Jean Tirole, won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2014 for his work on 
market power. 
17 See infra Section III.B.1. 
18 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
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has posited that intra-societal equality might be achieved if 
bottlenecks which control access to opportunity are opened up.
19
 
Third, regulatory open access requirements have traditionally 
been bolstered by an antitrust doctrine derived from common law: 
essential facilities. This doctrine requires the owner of a bottleneck 
facility to grant access to all users—even rivals of the owner—if the 
bottleneck is an infrastructure that cannot be feasibly duplicated.
20
 If 
regulations are weak or nebulous, essential facilities provides 
alternative recourse for the aggrieved competitor. Yet this doctrine 
was all but dismantled by the Supreme Court in Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.
21
 
Nonetheless, current antitrust litigation over FMIs may well 
resuscitate essential facilities from the brink.
22
 
Finally, the balance between antitrust and regulation is due to 
be recalibrated. Since Trinko, academics have offered a flurry of 
proposals to overhaul the role of antitrust in regulated industries.
23
 
That balance often comes into play in essential facilities cases, where 
a common law doctrine mirrors regulatory mechanisms for opening 
up a bottleneck.
24
 Because of deregulation, administrative agencies 
refrain from intrusive standard-setting, thereby forcing courts to 
cobble together answers from common law when aggrieved 
competitors sue.
25
 Consequently, the contours of “open access” may 
be played out in private actions under the antitrust analog of essential 
facilities. 
In channeling these four trends, this Article clarifies the 
antitrust peripheries of financial reform. Financial regulation has 
spurred naturally monopolistic clearinghouses; yet regulation cannot 
sufficiently deter the attendant effects on competition. Today’s 
regulators favor a hands-off approach that merely sets the baseline 
for open, nondiscriminatory access in the form of what this Article 
 
19 JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014). 
20 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 
(1985); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 (1973). See 
also Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Essential Facilities 
Doctrine: The Lost Message of Terminal Railroad, UC Berkeley Public Law 
Research Paper No. 2407071 (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407071. 
21 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
22 See infra Section III.C. 
23 See Maurer &  Scotchmer, supra note 20; Adam Candeub, Trinko and Re-
Grounding the Refusal to Deal Doctrine, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 821 (2005); Brett 
Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008); Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing 
Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2011). 
24 Trinko was such a case. See infra Section III.C. 
25 See infra Section III.B.2. 
SUBMISSION COPY 4/6/2015  8:10 AM 
6   
 
calls “openness” mandates.26 Openness mandates abound in 
industries dominated by natural monopolies, but this approach 
requires the promulgation and enforcement of rules which precisely 
define “access.” Dodd-Frank falls short on both counts: its open 
access rules are nebulous, and violations are difficult to patrol. 
Consequently, this Article argues that the regulatory 
mechanism for ensuring open access to derivatives clearinghouses 
must be bolstered by a reinvigorated essential facilities doctrine. Yet 
Supreme Court precedent stands in the way—most prominently, 
Trinko. Thus, the recommendation to pair regulatory and antitrust 
openness mandates must be tacked onto the groundswell to refine, if 
not altogether undo, Trinko. 
This Article contributes to the growing body of literature on 
clearinghouses and FMIs
27
 and also wades into the debate over the 
role of antitrust in regulated industries.
28
 First, this Article shows 
how the balance between substantive regulation and competition 
policy will be reshaped if courts hear essential facilities claims 
against clearinghouses. This rebalancing is inevitable; for financial 
regulators have abdicated their standard-setting duties in favor of 
vague prescriptions about open, nondiscriminatory access. Second, 
this Article illuminates the broad category of such prescriptions—in 
the form of openness mandates—which encompass areas as disparate 
as financial, telecommunications, and employment regulations. 
The remainder of this Article unfolds as follows: 
Section II analyzes the natural monopoly traits of FMIs, 
focusing on derivatives clearinghouses. Clearinghouses tend to be 
controlled by the dominant players in the downstream trading 
market—that is, large financial institutions who are the primary 
dealers of derivatives instruments.
29
 These institutions can strengthen 
 
26 See infra Section II.A. 
27 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 14; Yadav, supra note 7; Mark J. Roe, 
Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1672 (2013); Kristin N. 
Johnson, Clearinghouse Governance: Moving Beyond Cosmetic Reform, 77 
BROOK. L. REV. 681 (2012); Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a 
Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153 
(2012); Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic 
Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank 
Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (2011). 
28 Compare Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (suggesting that antitrust should yield 
where a regulatory structure exists to “deter and remedy anticompetitive 
harm”), with Shelanski, supra note 23, at 685 (criticizing the Trinko court for 
“discount[ing] the potential for antitrust to complement regulation and to fill 
gaps where regulation is unsuccessful”). 
29 In downstream (retail) markets, firms sell products to end users; in 
upstream (wholesale) markets, firms sell to other firms. See OECD, DEFINING 
THE RELEVANT MARKET IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS Ch. 2, p 14 (2014). For this 
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their hand in the dealer market by denying their rivals access to 
clearinghouses. Thus, clearinghouses present a novel setting for 
harms such as leveraging and foreclosure that are commonly 
associated with bottlenecks and vertical integration. 
Section III canvasses the solutions to the anticompetitive 
effects of natural monopoly, including regulatory and antitrust 
mechanisms for ensuring open, nondiscriminatory access. Both sets 
of solutions grew out of the centuries-old duties imposed upon 
common carriers—businesses which interfaced with the general 
public and were charged with providing an equal level of service to 
all. Paradigmatic natural monopolies such as telecommunications 
and transportation have experienced intensive regulation at some 
point in their long histories, as well as antitrust actions brought by 
the Department of Justice or private litigants. For derivatives 
clearinghouses, however, financial regulators have adopted 
extraordinarily weak safeguards against leveraging and foreclosure: 
openness mandates which convey wide discretion to the regulated 
entities themselves. 
Part IV proposes that regulatory openness mandates be 
buttressed by the essential facilities doctrine. Yet this proposal, 
narrow as it is, must overcome Trinko, which counsels for antitrust to 
yield in the face of regulation. Thus, this Section explores arguments 
for and against the proposal, as well as the broader movement to 
overhaul Trinko. 
 
II. NATURAL MONOPOLY TRAITS OF FMIS 
This Section provides background on financial market 
infrastructures (“FMIs”) and natural monopolies. It begins by 
introducing several types of FMIs, focusing on derivatives 
clearinghouses, which occupy a central place in financial reform. 
Then this Section explains why clearinghouses should be classified 
as natural monopolies—first because regulation now requires most 
derivatives trades to run through clearinghouses, thereby ensuring 
their essentialness to the financial markets, and second because their 
economies-of-scale foster anticompetitive harms such as leveraging 
and foreclosure. 
 
A.   Financial Market Infrastructures 
 
The global economy depends on the smooth execution of 
financial transactions. When a pension fund sells some of its 
holdings in oil companies to buy stock in solar energy companies, or 
 
Article’s purposes, the trading (or dealer) market is downstream; the clearing 
market is upstream. 
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when a consumer purchases groceries by swiping a credit card, a vast 
system of interconnected financial networks perform the hidden, 
back-office functions to complete the transactions. These networks 
are comprised of FMIs, a broad class of intermediaries which 
reconcile, confirm, record, transmit, clear, and settle transactions.
30
 
FMIs include credit cards, which enable consumers to pay 
merchants without the use of cash;
31
 interbank messaging systems, 
which allow banks to transmit account and payment details;
32
 and 
clearinghouses, which clear and settle trades in securities and 
derivatives instruments.
33
 Less well known FMIs are securities 
settlement systems, which register, settle, and memorialize securities 
transactions; trade repositories, which collect and maintain data for 
derivatives transactions; and electronic trading platforms, which 
provide venues for trading financial instruments.
34
 
There are slight differences in nomenclature when regulators 
speak of FMIs. “Financial market infrastructures” is usually the term 
preferred by non-U.S. regulators and international standard-setting 
bodies, while Dodd-Frank uses “financial market utilities,” which 
encompasses a narrower set of entities—clearinghouses, settlement 
systems, and payment systems.
35
 
Regardless of nomenclature, FMIs are colossal. In 2012, the 
National Securities Clearing Corporation cleared $186 trillion in 
 
30 See supra note 3. 
31 Levitin, supra note 4, at 1329-30. 
32 See SWIFT, supra note 5. 
33 Clearing and settlement can be more precisely broken down into three 
functions: (i) matching of orders, (ii) clearing of trades, and (iii) settlement 
(ensuring payment by the purchaser and delivery by the seller). For excellent 
summaries, see DERMOT TURING, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE §§ 1.2-1.14 
(2012); John McPartland, Clearing and Settlement Demystified, CHICAGO FED. 
LET., no. 210 (2005). 
34 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & OICU-IOSCO, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS (2001), 
at www.bis.org/publ/cpss42.pdf; Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council, Securities Settlement Systems, http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-
booklets/wholesale-payment-systems/securities-settlement-systems.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2015); Karlo Kauko, Interlinking Securities Settlement 
Systems: A Strategic Commitment? (ECB Working Paper No. 427; Bank of 
Finland Discussion Paper No. 26/2003), 2005, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=501742; European 
Commission, Central Securities Depositories (2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/central_securities_depositories/index_en.htm. 
35 Compare BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & OICU-IOSCO, supra note 3, and Bank 
of England, Bank of England’s Supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures 
(Mar. 2014), with 12 U.S.C. § 5462(6). See also Financial Stability Board, OTC 
Derivatives Market Reforms: Fourth Progress Report on Implementation n.1 
(Oct. 31, 2012). 
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securities transactions. In the derivatives world, the notional (or 
contractual) value of the over-the-counter derivatives market is even 
bigger—roughly $700 trillion, divided among various financial 
instruments.
36
 Clearinghouses of the InterContinental Exchange 
(“ICE”) control a large chunk of the processing of those trades. In 
2010, ICE Clear Europe cleared over $3 trillion in European credit 
default swaps, and its affiliate ICE Trust U.S. cleared $6 billion in 
similar instruments. Another example, drawn from payment 
messaging and data transmission services, is SWIFT. SWIFT is a 
member-owned cooperative that serves over 10,800 financial 
institutions in 216 countries on any given day.
37
 Finally, for 
consumers, Visa is perhaps the most familiar credit card network in 
the world, with 2.2 billion cards issued by 14,300 financial 
institutions and accepted by 36 million merchants.
38
 Other than credit 
cards, these FMIs are the largest financial institutions that most of 
the world has never heard of. 
As the name suggests, financial market infrastructures (or 
utilities) are a massive system of interlocking components that work 
behind the scenes. They are often referred to as the “plumbing” of 
global finance.
39
 To function smoothly, they must be large and 
interconnected. Imagine the ensuing frustration, for instance, if 
transactions in oil and solar company stocks were serviced by 
different FMIs that could not reconcile transactions quickly. Our 
pension fund may have to wait several days for the sale of its oil 
holdings to settle before the funds came through to buy solar. In the 
early years of the credit card industry, consumers faced somewhat 
similar problems. Holders of American Express and Discover cards 
had a comparatively difficult time paying with them because fewer 
merchants were part of those credit card networks. American Express 
and Discover had not attained the scale of subscription that enabled 
them to enjoy network effects.
40
 
 
36 Bank for Int’l Settlements, Derivatives Statistics, tbl. 19 (Sept. 14, 2014), 
http://perma.cc/877H-SL8C?type=pdf. Derivatives can be divided into 
exchange-traded and over-the-counter: the first category is traded on open 
markets such as futures and options exchanges; the second category is 
customized between the two parties to a trade. See Feder, supra note 6, at 
731-36. 
37 SWIFT, supra note 5 (follow link to SWIFT data for Dec. 2014). 
38 Visa, Visa Transaction, http://usa.visa.com/about-visa/our-business/visa-
transaction.jsp (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
39 See Ben S. Bernanke, Clearinghouses, Financial Stability, and Financial 
Reform, remarks at Financial Markets Conference, Stone Mountain, Ga., Apr. 4, 
2011, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110404a.ht
m. 
40 See HERBERT HOVENKEMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLES AND EXCLUSION 
(2006); Levitin, supra note 4, at 1363-65. Network effects means that an 
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To illustrate an FMI’s network effects, we can take the 
example of clearinghouses. A clearinghouse is a central 
counterparty—or an entity that sits in the middle of financial activity 
among numerous other parties—which effectively guarantees the 
trades of its members (see Figure 1). A fundamental tenet of Dodd-
Frank is to interpose central clearing onto the over-the-counter 
derivatives markets and then closely regulating the providers of 
clearing services. The statute does this in two parts. Title VII under 
Dodd-Frank requires all derivatives trades to run through 
clearinghouses called derivatives clearing organizations (“DCOs”).41 
Title VIII governs financial market utilities such as DCOs and 
central securities depositories, with heightened scrutiny over the 
systemically important utilities.
42
 
 
Figure 1: Centralized Clearing through a Clearinghouse* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The light grey circle in the center is the clearinghouse. Dark grey 
circles represent the clearinghouse members whose trades are backed 
by the clearinghouse; black circles represent entities which are not 
clearinghouse members but which trade with clearinghouse members.  
 
In a centrally cleared trade, the buyer and seller transfer their 
positions to a clearinghouse, so that the clearinghouse becomes a 
buyer to every seller and a seller to every buyer.
43
 In this way, the 
clearinghouse shoulders the risk that one party might default on its 
obligations. 
 
enterprise’s value increases if there are more users of the enterprise—a 
telephone network, for example, becomes more valuable the more telephone 
users there are. Levitin, supra note 4, at 1363. 
41 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1a(15); 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3. 
42 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5464. 
43 This process is called “novation.” For a primer, see Darrell Duffie & 
Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty 
Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74, 77 (2011). 
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Not every party in a trade has the right to clear through a 
clearinghouse; only members of a clearinghouse have access, and 
members are typically large financial institutions.
44
 This 
membership-driven design allows clearinghouses to withstand a 
certain degree of market volatility. Members back their positions by 
posting collateral with the clearinghouse, and they also pay into a 
default fund overseen by the clearinghouse.
45
 Thus, if one member 
loses a substantial amount on a trade, the member can cover the loss 
with posted collateral. If collateral is insufficient, or if multiple 
members suffer staggering losses, the clearinghouse can tap the 
default fund. Hence, the clearinghouse functions as a guarantor for 
its members that also mutualizes, or dissipates, losses before they 
spread to the rest of the financial markets.
46
 
As with any guarantor, a clearinghouse tends to function 
better if it is large. Large clearinghouses can amass a fortress of 
collateral from broad membership to backstop trades. Further, large 
clearinghouses can also net (or offset) more positions against each 
other, which in turn lowers funding costs for trades and entrenches 
the advantage of established clearinghouses.
47
 
Yet a quandary plagues FMIs: the larger and more 
interconnected an infrastructure, the more systemically significant it 
becomes. If an FMI is jammed up, nations and industries will be 
affected. And in times of crisis, the network itself can transmit 
contagion.
48
 
One way to conceptualize a clearinghouse is as a fortress 
built upon a foundation of rock-solid members and their collateral 
and guaranty fund. Another way, however, is as a conduit that 
concentrates transmits risk in times of crisis. As the financial crisis 
illustrated, a crisis can spark losses that are both severe and 
correlated.
49
 They are severe in their degree and correlated in that 
multiple firms are affected. The subprime mortgage meltdown, for 
instance, touched wide swathes of the economy beyond the issuers of 
 
44 See, e.g., ICE Clear Credit Participant List, INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, 
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/ICE_Clear_Credit_Participa
nt_List.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2014) (listing affiliates of Bank of America, 
Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman 
Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Nomura, Société 
Générale, Royal Bank of Novia Scotia, Royal Bank of Scotland, and UBS as 
members). 
45 Roe, supra note 27, at 1660. 
46 For a nuanced analysis of mutualization, see id. at 1660, 1675-80. 
47 For a similarly nuanced analysis of netting, see id. at 1660-62. For examples 
of how a clearinghouse’s harnesses netting to mitigate risk and reduce 
collateral requirements, see Kress, supra note 27, at 66-69. 
48 Chang, supra note 14, at 133-34.  
49 Id. 
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those mortgages—from the banks which packaged and trafficked in 
mortgage derivatives to the pension funds and municipalities that 
bought them. If a clearinghouse has numerous members whose 
volatile investments crash simultaneously, and if circuit breakers 
such as the default fund are insufficient, then the systemically 
significant clearinghouse could fail. Otherwise healthy members 
could simultaneously be taken down because the clearinghouse 
would turn to them for support.
50
 
The failure of a clearinghouse is not pure speculation. On 
occasion, clearinghouses have failed in the past—or come very close 
to failing. Most notably, Options Clearing Corporation, the world’s 
largest options clearinghouse, run by the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange, nearly had to ask for access to the Federal Reserve’s 
Discount Window during the financial crisis in 2008.
51
 In 1987, after 
the stock market crash known as Black Monday, the Federal Reserve 
did have to step in to shore up capital and confidence in OCC when 
its funds became insufficient to weather its members’ losses.52 That 
year, the clearinghouse for the Hong Kong Futures Exchange, ICCH 
Hong Kong, also went under.
53
 Nonetheless, clearinghouses have 
generally worked well in the past and have been able to harness their 
default management procedures to minimize disruptions to the 
economy.
54
 
One major caveat to their continued success, however, is the 
sheer scale of trading activity being pushed to central counterparties. 
During the financial crisis, the leaders of the G-20 recognized that 
the most significant source of systemic risk laid in the over-the-
counter (formerly uncleared) derivatives markets.
55
 The consensus 
resulted in a concerted push to mandate central clearing in these 
markets, whose size boggles the mind. The past six years have 
witnessed the propulsion of nearly $700 trillion in trades toward 
clearinghouses. This figure dwarfs the size of almost any other 
 
50 Roe, supra note 27, at 1675-80. 
51 Nina Mehta, Options Clearinghouse Lobbies for Access to Fed Funding During 
Emergencies, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 23, 2010, http://perma.cc/9R8T-DMRF; 
Kress, supra note 27, at 50. 
52 Ben S. Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 
133, 146-50 (1990); U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE OCTOBER 1987 
MARKET BREAK (1988). 
53 Robert Steigerwald, Central Counterparty Clearing and Systemic Risk 
Regulation (2014), manuscript on file with author; SECURITIES REVIEW 
COMMITTEE, THE OPERATION AND REGULATION OF THE HONG KONG SECURITIES 
INDUSTRY (1988). 
54 For a noteworthy example, see infra note 79. 
55 Group of Twenty (G-20), Leader’s Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept. 
24-25, 2009). 
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financial market on earth by an order of magnitude.
56
 Although 
DCOs are being built upon a model of central counterparties that has 
existed for over a century, it is the breadth of their responsibility that 
raises concern. Industry and regulators may not have had enough 
time to think through all the contingencies—nor, arguably, the 
wherewithal to arrest the velocity of contagion should even a fraction 
of this market crash again. 
 
B.   FMIs as Natural Monopolies 
 
A natural monopoly arises when a market is more efficiently 
serviced by one producer than multiple ones. This condition is 
known as subadditivity, where costs are lower when one firm 
produces all goods than any combination of additional firms 
divvying up the output.
57
 The monopoly supplier cannot be 
disciplined by competition, either because (i) average costs decrease 
with increasing production, so the incumbent supplier will always be 
cheaper, or (ii) entry into the market requires enormous investment, 
so insurgents are deterred by (or the government must product the 
incumbent’s) sunk costs.58 Common examples of natural monopoly 
occur in transportation, utilities, and telecommunications, industries 
characterized at some point by intensive regulation which permitted 
single-firm dominance in exchange for rate-setting.
59
 
FMIs, too, have been observed to be natural monopolies.
60
 
Due to the network effects of established FMIs, insurgents find it 
very difficult to wrench away market share. The early challenges of 
American Express and Discover in competing with the established 
payment systems of Visa and Mastercard, for example, became the 
basis for extensive litigation. In 1991, Visa U.S.A. added a section to 
 
56 See Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis 
Is Inevitable, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://perma.cc/6Z32-NHC4 (comparing 
the OTC derivatives market to the size of the global economy); Back to the 
futures?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 2013 (comparing the OTC derivatives market to 
the size of the world’s securities markets); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY (OCC), OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES 
ACTIVITIES, THIRD QUARTER 2014 table 1 (2014) (listing the notional values of 
OTC versus exchange-traded derivatives). 
57 Ramsi A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, n.87 
(2013). 
58 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 742 (West Academic Publ’g, 2d ed. 2006); Ghosh, supra 
note 2, at 1138–39; SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 21–24 (1988); DANIEL F. SPULBER, 
REGULATION AND MARKETS 3–5, 42–43 (1989). 
59 See infra Section III.A. 
60 See Thanh Tu Nguyen, EC Antitrust Law in Payment Card Systems, Master’s 
Thesis, Lund University (2003) (analyzing the network effects of credit cards). 
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its bylaws which automatically terminated any merchant from the 
Visa network if the merchant were to issue American Express, 
Discover, or any other card which competes with Visa.
61
 Visa 
considered expanding this exclusivity rule to its foreign affiliates, 
and litigation soon followed.
62
 In Europe, American Express and the 
bank Dean Witter contended that the exclusivity rule would restrain 
competition among credit card systems, since rivals of Visa would be 
foreclosed from entering markets which Visa had already 
penetrated.
63
 In the U.S., the Department of Justice successfully sued 
Visa and Mastercard (which also enacted an exclusivity rule) for 
violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
64
 Ironically, nearly 20 years 
later, DOJ would also sue American Express for a 
“nondiscrimination provision” in its governing documents which 
compels members to favor American Express at the expense of its 
rivals.
65
 
Slightly less well-known, though perhaps more salient, are 
the competitive advantages of large, established clearinghouses. 
Large clearinghouses can draw upon a broad membership to offset 
counterparty liabilities and thereby lower the amount of required 
collateral. As observed in the prior Subsection, large clearinghouses 
enjoy a competitive advantage because of their availability to tap a 
broader membership pool and, therefore, more positions to net 
against one another. Superior netting ability translates into lower 
clearing and settlement prices. Not surprisingly, clearing markets 
tend to be dominated by the early entrants and are very difficult to 
penetrate for newcomers.
66
 
Large, naturally monopolistic clearinghouses threaten 
competition in two ways: foreclosure and leveraging. These two 
dangers are often interrelated in a bottleneck facility. For 
clearinghouses in particular, smaller users might be blocked from 
access if incumbent clearinghouse members (which tend to be large 
financial institutions) set membership requirements too high.
67
 And 
 
61 Id. at 40. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See U.S. v Visa USA Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
65 See Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Memorandum, U.S. v. American Express Co., No. 10-
CV-04496 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). 
66 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange has long dominated agricultural futures, 
the Options Clearing Corporation securities futures, and LCH credit default 
swaps in Europe. For an analysis of similar trends in exchanges, see U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Review of the Regulatory Structure Associated with Financial 
Institutions, Comments before the Dep’t of the Treasury 10 (Jan. 31, 2008). 
67 See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1201 
(2013) (“In the simplest story, the excluders act on their own, without 
enlisting assistance from other parties, to raise the costs of market entry. The 
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given Dodd-Frank’s central clearing mandate, if the excluded users 
are also sellers of derivatives instruments, then their very survival is 
impugned, as their products will be unable to be cleared. (For a 
rendering of the clearinghouse as a bottleneck facility, see Figure 2.) 
 
 
Figure 2: The Clearinghouse as Bottleneck 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As often happens, a natural monopoly may become a 
bottleneck facility by which the facility’s owners can strengthen their 
hand in the downstream market by constricting access of the owners’ 
competitors to the bottleneck itself.
68
 The ability to parlay the market 
dominance of a bottleneck facility into dominance over an adjacent 
market is known a leveraging.
69
 Classically a Section 2 claim under 
the Sherman Act, leveraging is one form of abuse of dominance by a 
 
excluders might manipulate a standard-setting process to exclude the rival, 
engineer product incompatibility, or game the regulatory system.”). 
68 See RUBEN LEE, RUNNING THE WORLD’S MARKETS: THE GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 21 (2011). 
69 This harm is particularly acute where industries are vertically integrated. 
See Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure 1, in HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION III (Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter eds., 2006). 
CH Member 
 
Clearinghouse (“CH”) 
Downstream Dealer Market 
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CH Member 
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monopolist, by which two distinct monopolies charging two sets of 
monopoly rents are created.
70
 
For decades, leveraging was criticized in another theory, 
whose most prominent adherent was the Chicago School of 
economics.
71
 As the Chicago School argued, a monopolist in one 
market has no need to leverage its way to dominance over a second 
market; for the monopolist could maximize profits simply by 
charging supracompetitive prices in the first market.
72
 This was 
known as the single monopoly profit theory. Extended to 
clearinghouses, the single monopoly profit theory might posit that a 
dominant dealer of credit default swaps need not simultaneously 
corner the upstream clearing market by way of a proxy 
clearinghouse; for the dealer could make more money by charging 
higher prices for credit default swaps in the downstream retail market 
for those products.
73
 
But leveraging has been regaining traction.
74
 Economists 
Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole have shown that the refusal of a 
bottleneck facility’s owners to deal with rivals could be a tactic of 
raising those rivals’ costs.75 This problem is especially pronounced if 
the owners are dominant players in a downstream market (e.g., 
dealers, or sellers, of derivatives) which band together to deny access 
to an essential upstream facility (e.g., clearinghouses).
76
 Such a 
scenario might unfold in the financial markets as follows: the largest 
 
70 See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 
108 (2d Cir. 2002) (listing the elements of a leveraging claim as (i) possession 
of monopoly power in one market, (ii) using that power to gain a competitive 
advantage in another distinct market, and (iii) thereby causing injury) (citing 
Virging Atl. Airways v. British Airways, 257 F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001). 
71 See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage 
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and 
the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397 (1967); Richard S. Markovits, Tie-ins, 
Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195 (1970); Richard A. 
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). 
72 HERBERT HOEVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE § 7.9 (4th ed. 2010). 
73 There are additional questions that supporters and detractors of the single 
monopoly profit theory would wrestle over. For instance, how much market 
power does the dealer possess? Also, how many other dealers are on similar 
footing? These are critical inquiries because the derivatives dealer market is 
often cornered by a consortium of big banks which compete with one another. 
See infra note 85 and accompanying text. Of course, such competition among 
large dealers does not obviate parallel exclusion by those dealers as a bloc 
against smaller dealers. See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 67. 
74 See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009). 
75 See Rey & Tirole, supra note 69. For a concise summary of Rey and Tirole’s 
arguments, see Candeub, supra note 23, at 852-53. 
76 Id. 
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four credit default swap (“CDS”) dealers—which, incidentally, tend 
to also be the most powerful members of CDS clearinghouses—
might somehow restrict the access of smaller dealers to a CDS 
clearinghouse, thereby frustrating the efforts of excluded dealers to 
sell CDS. Because Dodd-Frank requires most derivatives trades to 
pass through a clearinghouse, the clearing function has become 
essential, or indispensable, to the trading function. Smaller dealers 
without access to clearinghouses have to clear through the large 
banks which are clearinghouse members or face the risk that 
customers of smaller dealers will simply migrate to the large dealers. 
The choice is one between paying for access to a clearinghouse and 
abandoning the dealer market altogether. 
 Rey and Tirole’s findings directly refute the argument that a 
monopolist in one market need not leverage its way to dominance in 
another market to extract monopoly rents. Control of a bottleneck 
facility in an upstream market may help the monopolist in a 
downstream market maintain its dominance.  
Whatever its theoretical underpinnings, leverage and 
foreclosure have been pervasive fears for competitors of the large 
derivatives dealers. In 2010, shortly after Dodd-Frank’s passage, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) convened a 
roundtable with prominent leaders from industry and academia to 
discuss the implementation of the act’s central clearing mandate.77 
An enduring thread throughout the conversation was the likelihood 
of large banks excluding their smaller competitors from 
clearinghouses by ratcheting up the requirements for membership—
all in the guise of risk mitigation.
78
 Such a tactic would preserve the 
dominance of large banks in the dealer market by preventing smaller 
dealers from accessing clearinghouses.  
 
77 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n & Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 
Public Roundtable on Governance and Conflicts of Interest in the Clearing and 
Listing of Swaps, Washington, D.C., Aug. 20, 2010 [hereinafter CFTC 
Roundtable]. 
78 See id. at 25-26: 
 
The LCH is a closed system. It requires that one have not only 
$5 billion of net capital but $1 trillion of [sic] swaps already 
cleared . . . . [I]f we're going to be really clever about keeping 
people out of the system, the system is not going to work 
effectively. We're going to have the same OTC style, bilateral, 
closed, untransparent, opaque, risky system. And what we 
need to do is allow more entrants to diversify risk, address 
too big to fail and too interconnected to fail.”) (comments of 
Jason Kastner, Vice Chairman, Swaps & Derivatives Assoc.).  
 
Kastner begins by referring to LCH, a dominant European clearinghouse 
whose significance is discussed infra in notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
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The oft-cited example of aggressive membership criteria is 
LCH.Clearnet, a U.K.-based clearing consortium specializing in 
interest rate swaps.
79
 Prior to 2012, LCH.Clearnet’s SwapClear 
platform used to require that its members maintain an outstanding 
portfolio of $1 trillion in interest rate swaps,
80
 a requirement widely 
seen as keeping out all but the largest institutional sellers of these 
instruments.
81
 SwapClear removed this condition the year after the 
CFTC promulgated a series of rules designed to open up access to 
derivatives clearinghouses.
82
 Yet even today, three years after the 
elimination of that membership criterion, SwapClear members 
remain the goliaths of global finance.
83
 
The profile of SwapClear reveals that the movers of the 
interest rate swaps market are also the members of a dominant 
clearinghouse for interest rate swaps. This pattern is replicated in 
other derivatives markets. For example, ICE Clear Credit, a major 
clearinghouse for credit default swaps, also touts a membership list 
that includes the largest financial institutions.
84
 The concentration of 
the dealer market within the hands of a few large players is best 
illustrated with numbers. In the U.S., the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (“OCC”) publishes a quarterly ranking of the banks 
with the largest derivatives trading activity. In combing through 
those quarterly reports, one finds that the same four or five 
institutions perennially tower above everyone else. In its most recent 
report, the OCC noted that “[d]erivatives activity in the U.S. banking 
system continues to be dominated by a small group of large financial 
 
79 LCH.Clearnet became especially prominent during the financial crisis, when 
it cushioned the markets from the default by a Lehman Brothers affiliate of $9 
trillion in interest rate swaps. See Natasha de Terán, How the World’s Largest 
Default Was Unraveled, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 13, 2008), http://perma.cc/JB66-52TV; 
Press Release, LCH.Clearnet, $9 Trillion Lehman OTC Interest Rate Swap 
Default Successfully Resolved (Oct. 8, 2008), http://perma.cc/KFF6-L9WH.  
80 See LCH.Clearnet, Submission of Amendments to the Clearinghouse Rules 3, 
Submission to the Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Apr. 16, 2012), 
available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@rulesandproducts/documents
/ifdocs/rul041612lch001.pdf. 
81 See supra note 78; TURING, supra note 33, at § 5.6(3). 
82 Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 
76 Fed. Reg. 69334 (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter DCO Core Principles]. 
83 See SwapClear, Our Clearing Members, 
http://www.swapclear.com/service/our-members.html (listing, as 
SwapClear’s U.S.-domiciled members, affiliates of Barclays, BNP Paribas, 
Citibank, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, 
Morgan, Nomura, UBS, and Wells Fargo) (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
84 See supra note 44. 
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institutions. Four large commercial banks represent 92.6 % of the 
total banking industry notional amounts.”85 
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that the fight over 
access to clearinghouses is the proxy for a confrontation with much 
more at stake: control of the adjacent derivatives dealer market. As 
one panelist on the CFTC Roundtable noted: 
 
96 percent of the swap market is executed by the 
largest 10 banks. I think they call that an oligopoly. 
And the notion is if you introduce more competition 
into that 40 to 60 billion dollars which are at risk or 
being earned by execution [trading or selling], that’s 
where the pushing and shoving begins. It's not about 
clearing per se; it's about competition for execution in 
interest rate swaps and CDS.
86
 
 
In other words, the derivatives dealer market is where the real action 
lies. Profits in the dealer market dwarf profits in the clearing 
market,
87
 which are fairly efficient already.
88
 If anything, the dealer 
markets are more opaque—an opacity that stems from the high 
degree of concentration and results in supracompetitive prices.
89
  
 
III. TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS FOR NATURAL MONOPOLY 
This Section canvasses the solutions to natural monopoly 
problems of leverage and foreclosure. It begins broadly, with the 
history of natural monopoly regulation in the United States. This 
history has culminated in a blurry set of obligations which this 
Article calls the “openness mandate.” 
The openness mandate has its roots in the nondiscrimination 
duties of common carriers devised centuries ago under English 
 
85 OCC, supra note 56, at 1. 
86 CFTC Roundtable, supra note 77, at 47 (comments of Jason Kastner).  
87 See id. at 33 (“[A]nnually, there's estimated to be about 3- to $500 million 
made clearing, and there are between 40- and $60 billion being made trading. 
So this discussion of clearing and access to clearing is really just a proxy about 
access to trading, because that's where the revenues are.”) (comments of 
Randy Kroszner, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Booth School 
of Business). 
88 See J.P.Morgan, Competition or Consolidation: The Outlook for 
Interoperability among European CCPs, in THOUGHT (2012). 
89 See Wallace Tuberville, Derivatives Clearinghouses in the Era of Financial 
Reform (Oct. 24, 2010), http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/derivatives-
clearinghouses-era-financial-reform (chronicling how the big banks shunned 
efforts by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to introduce transparency into the 
pricing of credit default swaps).  
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common law and codified in U.S. and English statutes governing 
railroads in the 1800s.
90
 By an accident of deregulation, the openness 
mandate has become the reigning approach toward overseeing 
industries characterized by a high degree of vertical integration. 
This Section then explores the interplay of openness 
mandates in regulation and antitrust governing certain market 
infrastructures (specifically, derivatives clearinghouses), which are 
natural monopolies that can become competition-stifling bottlenecks. 
Because regulators have come to favor a gentler approach toward 
natural monopolies, financial market bottlenecks only have to 
contend with the openness mandate. In isolation, neither the 
regulatory openness mandate nor its antitrust analog is sufficient to 
deter the abuses of market dominance. 
 
A.   Utility Regulation and the Openness Mandate 
 
The traditional response to natural monopoly used to be 
public utility regulation, where a producer’s monopoly is protected 
from competition in exchange for a broad duty to serve the public. 
Consequently, the monopoly submits to intimate regulation, 
particularly of the rates it charges consumers.
91
 Deviation from 
preset rates must clear both regulators and the public, in the venue of 
public hearings.
92
 
Paradigmatic natural monopolies fall into two camps. In one 
camp is the classic public utility—a power company, for instance, 
which generates and delivers electricity.
93
 The other camp consists of 
common carriers such as railroads which are obligated to serve the 
public on an open, nondiscriminatory basis.
94
 Both utility and 
common-carrier regulations share the same roots in the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887. This act formulated the strict rate-setting 
rule known as the filed rate doctrine, pursuant to which regulated 
 
90 James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to 
Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMMUNICATIONS L.J. 225, 251-52 (2003). 
91 See SPULBER, supra note 58, at 271-79. 
92 Id. at 271 
93 The primary regulator of power companies in the U.S., the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, is empowered by the Federal Power Act of 1935 to 
ensure that wholesale prices are “just and reasonable.” See Richard Gilbert & 
David Newberry, Market Power in US and EU Electricity Generation 169-70, in 
ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN THE EU AND US (François Lévêque & Howard 
Shelanski eds., 2009). 
94 See Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 
878-80 (2009). 
SUBMISSION COPY 4/6/2015  8:10 AM 
2015]      FINANCIAL MARKET BOTTLENECKS 21 
 
entities were to file their rates with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.
95
 
Yet a public utility or common carrier framework cannot be 
practicably adapted to clearinghouse regulation, for reasons which 
are both technical and doctrinal. Technically, an intensive approach 
such as the filed rate doctrine would require the CFTC or SEC to 
scrutinize clearinghouse fee structures to ensure that they are 
adjusted if costs fluctuate. Clearinghouses would be obliged to serve 
far more counterparties than they currently do, with less discretion to 
exclude on the basis of risk. While this would minimize the 
possibility of price discrimination among participants, oversight this 
close would demand a level of expertise that regulators do not 
possess.
96
 Clearinghouse cost and fee structures are extremely 
difficult to assess. Numerous clearinghouses, particularly in the 
futures markets, are vertically integrated with exchanges.
97
 These 
proprietary clearinghouses can bury clearing and settlement 
surcharges in trading fees assessed by the exchange, or vice versa.
98
 
Not surprisingly, advocates of utility treatment for FMIs do not find 
that theirs is a mainstream position.
99
 
The more compelling explanation for why utility treatment 
would be untenable is the paradigm shift that natural monopoly 
 
95 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1330-34 (1998). 
96 See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 77, at 100 (“I think a regulator has to be 
very careful in second guessing experience to risk managers.”) (comments of 
Bill Naven, Options Clearing Corporation); 102 (“I would certainly encourage 
the CFTC and the SEC to reach out to those risk managers to get their direct 
views on how these risks and these conflicts are best managed.”) (comments 
of Bill Hill, Morgan Stanley). See also DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 
69477-78 (comments of Commissioner Scott O’Malia).  
97 Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of Regulation of Clearing in 
the Securities and Futures Markets, and Its Impact on Competition, 30 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 313, 374 (2010). Exchanges create a marketplace for the 
purchase and sale of financial instruments, while clearinghouses ensure the 
fulfillment of obligations by the buyer and seller. Chang, supra note 14, at 114-
15. 
98 These are common tactics of vertically integrated enterprises. For some 
perspective, see SPULBER, supra note 58, at 277-79. 
99 But see Paul Tucker, Are Clearinghouses the New Central Banks?, Keynote 
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Symposium, Apr. 11, 2014, Chicago, available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/events/2014/annual_over_
the_counter_derivatives_symposium/tucker_clearinghouses_new_central_ban
ks_tucker_2014.pdf. The former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, 
Tucker is a powerful, if lone, voice to the contrary. See also Stephen J. Lubben, 
Nationalize the Clearinghouses! (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 
2458506), 2014, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2458506. 
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regulation has undergone in the past 40 years. Commonly but 
inaccurately called deregulation, this trend has supplanted rate 
regulation in favor of a framework where regulators simply set 
ground rules designed to maximize competition within an 
industry.
100
 It is the product of decades of assault upon heavy-handed 
regulation, resulting in a lighter regulatory touch that heralds 
competition above all else, including the public interest.
101
 
The best example of this shift is the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996. Prior to the Telecommunications Act, the handful of 
companies controlling the provision of local and long-distance 
telephone services were insulated from competition in return for a 
broad commitment to serve all callers.
102
 These companies were the 
“Baby Bells,” the survivors of a 1984 divestiture of AT&T by the 
Justice Department.
103
 In 1996, however, the Telecommunications 
Act revolutionized the regulatory philosophy. Under this act, the 
Baby Bells had to make way for competition from insurgents known 
as “competitive local exchange carriers.”104 The mechanism for 
doing so was an interconnectivity mandate that enabled the insurgent 
carriers to access the incumbents’ local telephone exchange 
networks. It was an approach that had not been entertained in the 
prior rounds of antitrust action against AT&T.
105
 The magnitude of 
this reorientation is difficult to overstate. Telecommunications 
regulators had moved from a rubric of constant and intrusive 
supervision to one revolving around a broad but less intensive duty 
of interconnection—a duty premised upon the obligation to grant 
access to, or deal with, rivals. 
This duty has taken on different names in different settings, 
including “open access,” “duty to deal,” and “nondiscrimination.”106 
For cohesion, this Article refers to this general set of obligations as 
the openness mandate. 
Antecedents of the openness mandate stretch back to the duty 
of reasonable care imposed by medieval law upon tradesmen who 
held themselves out to the general public; over time, its prescriptions 
broadened into the common carrier duty to serve, even as its 
coverage narrowed to trades whose practitioners effectively wielded 
a monopoly—particularly trades associated with transportation, such 
as innkeepers.
107
 In the U.S., common carrier duties made their early 
 
100 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 95, at 1324-26. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1351-52.  
103 Id. at n.127; Hemphill & Wu, supra note 67, at 1199. 
104 Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 
1217-23 (2002). 
105 Id. at 1217. 
106 See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 95, at 1352. 
107 Speta, supra note 90, at 255-56. 
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appearance in iconoclastic cases pertaining to public utilities and 
railroads in the 1800s.
108
 Through the ebbs and flows of rate 
regulation and deregulation, some of the core characteristics of 
common carrier duties have endured—namely, the duty to openly 
serve, on a nondiscriminatory basis, a broad class of consumers.
109
 
Today, even the fiercest detractors of telecom monopolies 
seem to have accepted the immovability of this philosophy—that 
competition is the ultimate aspiration, best safeguarded by foisting a 
duty to deal upon the monopolist. For instance, one especially 
contentious debate concerns the “net neutrality” obligations of 
internet service providers, which deliver web content to consumers 
and other users. On one side are the internet service providers 
themselves, many of whom are Baby Bells, advocating for a right to 
speed up the delivery of content for certain websites; on the other 
side is a diverse alliance that includes academics and consumer 
advocates, arguing that fast-tracking certain content would be 
discriminatory.
110
 Yet as this debate rages on, critics of the dominant 
internet service providers have merely argued against preferential 
treatment, without suggesting a paradigm-shifting alternative for 
regulation. 
To be sure, the openness mandate conveys numerous 
benefits: it eschews labor-intensive rate-setting as well as wrangling 
over the proper measure of consumer welfare; instead, it imposes a 
clear baseline of open, nondiscriminatory access for competitors. 
Nonetheless, the openness mandate also entails some drawbacks. 
One drawback is the ambiguous relationship between regulatory and 
common law openness mandates. Most prominently, there is a 
vestige of common carrier duties which lingers in antitrust. It takes 
the form of the essential facilities doctrine. But before exploring the 
antitrust antecedent, this Article will first examine the openness 
mandate in financial reform regulation. 
 
B.   Nondiscriminatory Access in Financial Reform Regulation 
 
Like their counterparts in telecom, financial regulators have 
adopted openness mandates as the preferred method of patrolling 
access to bottlenecks in the financial markets. Dodd-Frank itself 
imposes open, nondiscriminatory access obligations for derivatives 
clearinghouses. Yet compared to the other facets of clearinghouse 
 
108 E.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876); Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). See also Speta, supra note 90, at 251-52. 
109 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 95, at 1349-53. 
110 Tim Wu, Net Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory 
Access, Testimony before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Telecom & 
Antitrust Task (2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=903118. 
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regulation, the provisions of Dodd-Frank addressing competition are 
weak and ambiguous. 
 
1.   The Eligibility Rule 
 
The statutory architecture of Dodd-Frank mandates central 
clearing under Title VII and close scrutiny over clearinghouses and 
other financial market utilities under Title VIII.
111
 Oversight of 
clearinghouses can be exacting and rigorous—the Federal Reserve, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) have the authority to 
prescribe strict rules on capital adequacy, risk management, default 
procedures, and collateral requirements.
112
 Additionally, Title VIII 
also permits access to central bank funds during a liquidity crunch.
113
 
From these perspectives, there is no question that clearinghouses are 
heavily regulated firms much like large market players in industries 
with a legacy of rate setting.
114
 
Concerning competition policy, however, Dodd-Frank is 
hazier. Section 725(c) of the act mandates, among other goals, (i) 
that derivatives clearing organizations (“DCOs”) establish 
“appropriate admission and continuing eligibility standards” and (ii) 
that DCO participation and membership requirements “be 
objective[,] be publicly disclosed[,] and permit fair and open 
access.”115 This is Core Principle C, one of several aspirational 
principles for clearinghouses found within the Commodity Exchange 
Act. Other core principles speak to risk management,
116
 default 
rules,
117
 recordkeeping,
118
 antitrust considerations,
119
 governance,
120
 
and conflicts of interest.
121
 
In essence, Core Principle C aims to prevent a clearinghouse 
from setting admission standards so high as to exclude the 
 
111 See supra notes 41 and 42 and accompanying text. Jurisdiction over 
clearinghouses is split between the SEC and CFTC. The two agencies have 
adopted similar regulatory approaches, but this Article will focus on 
clearinghouses under the CFTC’s jurisdiction. 
112 12 U.S.C. § 5464(c). 
113 See 12 U.S.C. § 5465(b) (2012). See also Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve 
as Last Resort, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69 (2012). 
114 This notion of “regulated firms” carries additional significance under 
antitrust, where, for many years, the pervasiveness of regulation meant that 
antitrust would defer. See infra Section III.C. 
115 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(C) (emphasis added). 
116 Core Principle D, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(D). 
117 Core Principle G, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(G). 
118 Core Principle K, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(K). 
119 Core Principle N, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(N). 
120 Core Principle O, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(O). 
121 Core Principle P, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(P). 
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competitors of its powerful members, the dominant derivatives 
dealers. Yet its language merely says, unhelpfully, that clearinghouse 
admission standards are to be “appropriate” and clearinghouse access 
is to be “fair and open.”122 
Implementing Core Principle C is a rule on participant and 
product eligibility which defines fair and open access as follows: 
 
(i) A [DCO] shall not adopt restrictive clearing 
member standards if less restrictive requirements that 
achieve the same objective and that would not 
materially increase risk . . . could be adopted; 
(ii) A [DCO] shall allow all market participants who 
satisfy participation requirements to become clearing 
members; 
(iii) A [DCO] shall not exclude or limit clearing 
membership of certain types of market participants 
unless the [DCO] can demonstrate that the restriction 
is necessary to address credit risk or deficiencies . . . 
(iv) A [DCO] shall not require that clearing members 
be swap dealers. 
(v) A [DCO] shall not require that clearing members 
maintain a swap portfolio of any particular size, or 
that clearing members meet a swap transaction 
volume threshold.
123
 
 
This Eligibility Rule operates on two fronts: by forcing 
clearinghouses to articulate objective and least-restrictive standards 
for membership and by preventing clearinghouses from pegging 
membership to size or volume thresholds. It neutralizes the 
propensity of large dealers to couch denials of access to 
clearinghouses as risk management decisions.  
 
122 Id. at § 7A-1(c)(2)(C). 
123 17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(1) [hereinafter the Eligibility Rule]. A similar rule has 
been promulgated by the SEC for clearing agencies under its jurisdiction. See 
17 C.F.R. 240.17Ad-22; Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and 
Governance, 76 Fed. Reg. 14472 (Mar. 16, 2011). However, this Article focuses 
on open access rules for DCOs under the CFTC’s jurisdiction. Further, this 
Article does not cover the rest of the rule on participant and product 
eligibility, which is voluminous. For instance, 17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(2) pertains to 
what DCOs can require of their members in the way of financial resources. 
Most notably, DCOs cannot set a minimum capital requirement of more than 
$50 million. 17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(2)(iii). Technically, that prohibition has no 
bearing on fair and open access. See DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 
69476 n.307. 
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Apart from Core Principle C and the Eligibility Rule, Dodd-
Frank also stipulates (i) that clearinghouses shall not unreasonably 
restrain trade or “impose any material anticompetitive burden”124 and 
(ii) that the act itself shall not “be construed to modify, impair, or 
supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws.”125 The former is 
Core Principle N. The latter is an antitrust savings clause, preserving 
antitrust enforcement in the face of substantive regulation. Together, 
these four provisions comprise the constellation of Dodd-Frank’s 
pronouncements on competition policy.
126
 
 
2.   Problems with the Eligibility Rule 
 
Dodd-Frank’s pronouncements on competition policy—and 
the Eligibility Rule in particular—suffer from several major 
problems. First and foremost, the provisions are vague. Second, they 
convey wide discretion to clearinghouses, the regulated entities 
themselves, to justify denials of access. Finally, given the highly 
technical nature of membership determination, infractions could be 
difficult to detect. Ultimately, regulators and competitors may have 
to turn to the voluminous but inconsistent body of antitrust case law 
to give shape to the parameters of Dodd-Frank’s openness mandate. 
While lawmakers can easily mandate open access to a 
bottleneck, the precise meaning of concepts such as “fairness,” 
“open,” and even “nondiscriminatory” is elusive.127 This chasm, 
between a sweeping mandate and systematic implementation, haunts 
other areas of law. Parallels can be found in areas that work with 
equality principles, such as antidiscrimination laws; usually, 
however, the mandate of nondiscrimination is clarified by extensive 
regulation or case law.
128
 But what happens if, as with Dodd-Frank, 
there is just one implementing rule that itself suffers from ambiguity 
(the Eligibility Rule), and the natural tendency to look to case law 
has been discouraged in recent antitrust decisions? The remainder of 
 
124 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(N). 
125 12 U.S.C. § 5303. 
126 Two additional pieces of Dodd-Frank touch upon competition concerns—
the $50 million maximum capital requirement for DCO membership, see 17 
C.F.R. 39.12(a)(2)(iii), and a proposal to set equity ownership limits in DCOs, 
see Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract 
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts 
of Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63732 (Oct. 18, 2010). But the former does not 
dovetail with fair and open access, see supra, note 123, and the latter, framed 
as a conflicts of interest issue, has languished in the rulemaking phase. Neither 
are subjects of this Article’s focus. 
127 See infra text accompanying notes 129-37. 
128 See Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and 
Proximate Cause, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
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Subsection takes up the weaknesses of the Eligibility Rule, leaving 
the relationship between Dodd-Frank and antitrust for the next 
Subsection. 
 
a.   Vagueness 
 
Vagueness inheres in Dodd-Frank’s openness mandate. It 
stems from the fact that the mandate’s implementation is fraught 
with an extremely technical judgment call—how to strike the right 
balance between open access and risk management.
129
 Indeed, in 
announcing finalization of the Eligibility Rule, the CFTC indicated 
that the rule was crafted to accomplish two goals: “(1) to provide for 
fair and open access, while (2) limiting risk to the DCO and its 
clearing members.”130 
The Eligibility Rule calls out these strictures in subparts i and 
iii, which note that fair and open access must account for the added 
risk to the clearinghouse, as well as credit risk and deficiencies of the 
prospective member.
131
 This balance makes sense as an operational 
matter; for a clearinghouse serves to diffuse risk across a large and 
diverse array of members.
132
 Yet a clearinghouse must also be 
discerning about whom it admits to membership: entities which are 
excessively leveraged relative to their credit profiles would do more 
to introduce than mitigate risk.
133
 Whether a prospective member’s 
risk profile counsels for exclusion instead of admission can vary 
from clearinghouse to clearinghouse and member to member—and 
even from time to time, as a clearinghouse might be less willing to 
admit a member when the clearinghouse foresees an imminent 
liquidity crunch.
134
  
This balance between access and risk is prone to obfuscation 
and, therefore, evasion of the principles embodied in the rule. In fact, 
how to reconcile the two concerns—and, more broadly, Dodd-Frank 
and competition policy—has confounded the industry since the 
 
129 DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69352. 
130 Id. at 69415. 
131 17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(1)(i), (iii). 
132 See DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69415 (“[I]ncreased access to 
clearing membership should reduce concentration at any one clearing 
member and diversify risk.”). But for counterpoints from clearinghouse 
detractors, see, e.g., Roe, supra note 27. 
133 See Jesse Eisinger, Dodd-Frank’s Derivatives Reforms: Clear as Mud, 
PROPUBLICA, Nov. 16, 2011, http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/dodd-
franks-derivatives-reforms-clear-as-mud (citing MF Global as a cautionary 
tale of admitting small, undercapitalized clearing members). 
134 See also see DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69475-76 (illustrating 
how the final rule also fails to account for differences in complexity between 
products—e.g., agricultural versus credit default swaps) (dissent of 
Commissioner Scott O’Malia). 
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statute’s inception. During the 2010 CFTC Roundtable on 
clearinghouses, intense debate centered on the ambiguity of the 
statute in addressing the anticompetitive effects of major market 
players. On one hand, smaller dealers worried that the dominant 
dealers might stifle competition by setting clearinghouse 
membership standards excessively high.
135
 Apart from competition 
concerns, this would subvert the mitigation of systemic risk in the 
derivatives markets that animates Dodd-Frank, mitigation which is 
achieved by dispersing risk across broader pools of members.
136
 On 
the other hand, legitimate concerns abound if a clearinghouse’s 
standard-setting prerogative is eroded to the point where members 
are admitted without due consideration to risk.
137
  
When the CFTC promulgated the Eligibility Rule a year later, 
the guidance was not particularly helpful. In some prongs, the rule 
merely recites the fact that clearinghouses can balance open access 
against risk.
138
 The final release for the Eligibility Rule proclaimed, 
triumphantly, that the balance had been appropriately struck.
139
 
However, Commissioner O’Malia issued a forceful dissent, citing to 
a recent dispute between a clearinghouse and some derivatives 
dealers over open access.
140
 Specifically, ICE Clear Credit had 
changed its minimum capital requirement to $100 million but 
simultaneously added a requirement that members hold a certain 
 
135 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
136 See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 77, at 14-15 (“[E]conomic interests 
should be set aside to mitigate systemic risk and protect the American public 
against further financial calamity. In order to do that, it is more efficient to 
bring transparency and open access and to allow more participants into the 
market to diversify risk.”) (comments of Jason Kastner). 
137 See id. at 15-16: 
 
Certainly open access is an important part of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, but it is certainly not the primary driver of the Act. I 
think one of the biggest conflicts that has to be addressed 
here is the conflict between open access and proper risk 
management of the clearinghouse. . . [C]learinghouses are 
going to be the ultimate repositories for all of the systemic 
risk that was previously dispersed throughout the market. . . 
[T]he members of the clearinghouse are ultimately the 
parties that are underwriting this risk and responsible for 
it.”) (comments of Jonathan Short, ICE Trust U.S., LLC) 
 
138 See supra text accompanying note 131. 
139 See DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69352 (“Although there is 
potential tension between the goals of ‘fair and open access’ and ‘sufficient 
financial resources and operational capacity to meet obligations arising from 
participation in the derivatives clearing organization,’ the Commission 
believes the rules that it is adopting herein strike an appropriate balance.”). 
140 Id. at 69475 (comments of Commissioner O’Malia). 
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amount of net capital.
141
 These changes were challenged by at least 
two dealers for violating fair and open access.
142
 According to 
Commissioner O’Malia, the final rule provided “very little guidance 
on the criteria that the Commission will apply in adjudicating a 
dispute such as this.”143 
The ambiguity of the Eligibility Rule invites other concepts 
and institutions to fill the void. One possibility is to push open access 
toward bright-line rules, so that the mandate can revolve around 
clearer orbits. For example, Dodd-Frank bars derivatives 
clearinghouses from requiring more than $50 million in capital as a 
condition of membership.
144
 As a technical matter, this prohibition 
has nothing to do with open access;
145
 however, it has attracted a 
great deal of attention from supporters and detractors of the 
Eligibility Rule.
146
 Another possibility is that open access 
determinations will be pushed toward federal courts, which might 
hear antitrust claims brought by excluded clearinghouse 
applicants.
147
 
 
b.   Discretion of clearinghouses 
 
At its best, the open-endedness of Dodd-Rank’s openness 
mandate renders the mandate too nebulous. At its worst, however, 
that open-endedness consigns too much power to the regulated 
entities themselves, the clearinghouses. 
It is the prerogative of a clearinghouse to set standards that 
ensure access while mitigating risk. In that prerogative, there is 
discretion. And with discretion, a clearinghouse can eviscerate open 
access by excluding competitors of existing members under the 
rubric of risk.  
Invoking risk dispenses with every element of the Eligibility 
Rule in one fell swoop. Because prongs i and iii of the rule expressly 
condition access on risk mitigation, this is a permissible basis for 
exclusion. Prong ii, which requires admitting members who meet 
participation requirements, is not violated if risk management was 
the justification for high bars to admission. Prongs iv and v, which 
prohibit tying membership to being a swap dealer or attaining size or 
volume thresholds, also do not come into play if a clearinghouse 
excludes on the basis of risk. 
 
141 That threshold was 5% of each member’s segregated consumer funds. Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See 17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(2)(iii). 
145 See DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69476 n.307. 
146 See, e.g., id. at 69474-76 (comments of Commissioner O’Malia); 
Greenberger, supra note 13, at 254-61. 
147 See infra Section III.C. 
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How have the clearinghouses handled this discretion? Today, 
three years have elapsed since the finalization of the Eligibility Rule. 
Its progress in ensuring open access and diversifying the dealer 
market can be assessed in two ways—by examining the membership 
requirements of the dominant clearinghouses and the degree of 
concentration in the dealer market. 
As to the first benchmark, the capitalization requirement of 
ICE Clear Credit challenged three years ago remains intact.
148
 An 
affiliated clearinghouse, ICE Clear Europe, also imposes a tiered 
capitalization structure that requires higher thresholds for certain 
members or financial instruments.
149
 The persistence of these 
conditions in the face of the Eligibility Rule suggests that the 
clearinghouses have fended off challenges from regulators and 
excluded applicants.
150
 
Meanwhile, empirical evidence shows that the ancillary goal 
of diversifying the dealer markets has clearly not come to pass. 
According to the OCC’s quarterly reports of bank derivatives 
positions, the same four institutions capture over 90% of the banking 
industry’s total notional amount quarter after quarter, year after year. 
In fourth quarter 2011, the year the Eligibility Rule was finalized, 
those top four banks were JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of 
America, and Goldman Sachs.
151
 Goldman Sachs, which held the 
fourth spot, had derivatives exposures nearly 10 times greater than 
 
148 Large members that qualify as futures commission merchants (“FCMs”) or 
broker-dealers are to have at least $100 million in adjusted net capital and 
more than 5% of segregated costumer funds as excess net capital. See ICE 
Clear Credit, Clearing Rules § 201(b)(ii). Non-FCM or –broker-dealer members 
are to bring $5 billion in tangible net equity to the table. Id. 
149 See ICE Clear Europe, Membership Procedures § 3.1 (May 19, 2010) 
(minimum capital requirement of $10 million for all clearing members); 
Clearing Rules 201(i) (Dec. 1, 2014) (establishing additional requirements for 
members clearing credit default swaps); CDS Procedures § 2.2(a) (May 19, 
2010) (requiring a minimum of $5 billion in Tier 1 Capital).  
150 Naturally, conclusions must be drawn with care. The persistence of high 
financial requirements for membership might mean that the CFTC upheld 
them against challenges for violating open access. Even so, this raises the 
specter of regulatory capture; for risk management is sufficiently complicated 
that regulators might not possess the expertise to scrutinize the 
clearinghouses’ judgment. See Tuberville, supra note 89. Another spot check is 
to look at whether the membership rosters of dominant clearinghouses have 
changed. For SwapClear’s membership, see supra note 83. 
151 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON 
BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FOURTH QUARTER 2011 tbl.1 (2011). 
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the bank holding the fifth spot, HSBC.
152
 This trend would continue 
unabated in every quarter that has followed.
153
 
The strategy of relying on clearinghouses to diversify the 
downstream dealer market is an odd one. If ever there were a symbol 
of the powerful derivatives dealers, it would be clearinghouses, 
whose membership rosters read like a who’s-who of the largest 
financial institutions in the world.
154
 Regulators obviously believe 
there is a correlation between concentration and systemic risk,
155
 and 
they may well have concluded that the Eligibility Rule’s roundabout 
way of inducing diversification is the best tool available.
156
 The 
strangest aspect of this strategy, however, which dooms the endeavor 
altogether, is the regulators’ abdication of their standard-setting 
duties to the regulated entities themselves. 
 
c.   Enforcement 
 
The complexity of risk management means that violations of 
the Eligibility Rule are difficult for regulators to detect. Dodd-Frank 
anticipates that compliance with the Core Principles will rest with the 
chief compliance officer of each clearinghouse.
157
 Nonetheless, 
because regulators do not possess the expertise to assess eligibility 
determinations, the reliance on clearinghouses leaves the fox to 
guard the proverbial henhouse.  If clearinghouse compliance 
departments are not vigorous with their charge, then the CFTC’s 
ability to impose civil monetary penalties and even deregistration is 
rendered meaningless.
158
 
To be sure, there are regulatory openness mandates and 
antidiscrimination prescriptions in other areas of law. These 
mandates seem to pose fewer problems so long as (i) the discretion 
 
152 See id. 
153 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Quarterly Report on Bank 
Derivatives Activities, http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/trading/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-report.html (follow the 
link for each the quarterly report). Intermittently, there are slight variations—
e.g., in the order of the top four banks and the degree of separation between 
the banks at the fourth and fifth spots. 
154 See, e.g., supra notes 44 and 83. 
155 See infra text accompanying note 277. 
156 See Roe, supra note 27, at 1690 (“[B]uilding largely centralized 
clearinghouses in the hope that (but not the certainty that) the industry will 
de-concentrate seems a peculiar policy in its indirectness, although perhaps 
regulators have concluded that they cannot otherwise induce market 
restructuring and de-concentration.”). 
157 See 17 C.F.R. § 39.10. 
158 The authority of the CFTC to impose penalties against derivatives 
clearinghouses can be found in the Commodity Exchange Act. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 
§ 8(b) (deregistration); 17 C.F.R. § 143.8 (civil monetary penalties). 
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of the regulated entities is limited, (ii) the benchmarks of openness 
are objective and discernible, or (iii) a concomitant private right of 
action helps ferret out the infractions. By contrast, Dodd-Frank 
suffers from a deficit of all three. 
In telecommunications, for example, the openness mandate 
takes the form of a requirement upon all carriers to interconnect with 
other carriers.
159
 Where negotiation between incumbents and 
insurgents is necessary for interconnection, the negotiation will be 
supervised by regulatory bodies and federal courts.
160
 And where 
large carriers merge with one another, the FTC constitutes an 
additional overlay of supervision to ensure open access.
161
 
Comparison with discrimination law, too, is illuminating. Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits workplace discrimination 
against protected classes of individuals, is enforced by an 
administrative agency (the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission), but employees also enjoy a private right of action.
162
 
Thus, Title VII has two pathways for enforcement: a regulator and 
private plaintiffs, which often work in tandem.
163
  
Comparison to counterparts elsewhere exposes two key 
weaknesses in the enforcement of Dodd-Frank’s openness mandate. 
First, mandates elsewhere are often blended with a private 
right of action. This is a powerful enforcement tool because often the 
entity best poised to detect a violation is that which has been 
excluded or discriminated against.
164
 By contrast, there is no private 
right of action for Core Principle C.
165
 
 
159 See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a); Speta, supra note 90, at 247-48 (discussing the 
Telecommunications acts of 1934 and 1996). 
160 47 U.S.C. § 251; Speta, supra note 90, at 248. 
161 Speta, supra note 90, at 235. 
162 For the proportion of government- versus privately prosecuted 
discrimination lawsuits, see J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private 
Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1148-50 
(2012). 
163 Id. 
164 See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 675 (2010) (arguing that private enforcement puts the enforcers closer 
to the relevant problems and permits individualized negotiation between 
incumbents and insurgents). Note, though, that the literature on pairing 
private and public enforcement, which is especially well developed in 
antitrust, is deeply split. For a contrary position, see a.Stacey L. Dogan & Mark 
A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009). 
Detractors are most worried about cumulative overdeterrence, or duplication 
of efforts between the plaintiffs’ bar and regulators. This concern will be taken 
up infra in Section IV.B.4. 
165 On the enforcement authority of the CFTC, see supra note 158 and 
accompanying text. 
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Second, the private right of action is sometimes found in 
parallel doctrines under antitrust that are on the wane, as in 
telecommunications regulation.
166
 Nevertheless, the regulators would 
have shared many decades of cohabitation with antitrust.
167
 A history 
of private enforcement history can help regulators become more 
deliberative in their own policies.
168
 The coexistence of a robust 
plaintiffs bar alongside the Federal Trade Commission and 
Department of Justice, for example, has shaped the government’s 
antitrust enforcement policy for decades
169—even if the agencies and 
the plaintiffs’ bar do not see eye-to-eye. 
By contrast, Dodd-Frank has engrafted an openness mandate 
onto financial reform laws, whose regulators do not have much 
familiarity with, or institutional memory of, how to deal with 
“openness.” The only rule that regulators have come up with so far, 
the Eligibility Rule, is not only sparse but also nebulous. 
 
C.   Essential Facilities in Antitrust 
 
The statutory openness mandate of Dodd-Frank is redolent of 
the antitrust doctrine of essential facilities, which also has its roots in 
the law of common carriers. Because of weaknesses in the regulatory 
mandate, regulators and excluded applicants may turn to antitrust for 
elucidation. Yet in the event of conflict between the regulatory 
openness mandate and its pre-existing antitrust counterpart, current 
Supreme Court precedent teaches that only regulation can prevail. 
Essential facilities draws from 100 years of tortuous antitrust 
case law,
170
 with the latest pronouncement casting doubt on its 
continued vitality.
171
 Still, there is little disagreement over its 
 
166 The most prominent example is essential facilities, which will be discussed 
infra in Section III.C. 
167 For instance, the Telecommunications Act, originally passed in 1934, and 
the Sherman Act, which dates to 1890, enjoyed many years of cohabitation, 
including decades before deregulation caught on. 
168 See Glover, supra note 162, at 1159 (“even SEC commissioners 
acknowledge that private enforcement plays a crucial role in regulating 
securities fraud”), 1160 (“private parties, at least as a functional matter, are 
often necessary for meaningful enforcement of regulatory directives to 
occur”).  
169 See id. at 1196-97 (“The DOJ relies heavily on antitrust wrongdoers to 
come forward under its Amnesty Program for the remediation of conspiracy-
related harm, but the DOJ also relies on private enforcement to detect 
instances of wrongdoing when parties are not so forthcoming.”). 
170 Compare United States v. Terminal R.R Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411-
13 (1912), Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 
(1985), and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 (1973), 
with Trinko, 540 U.S. See also infra text accompanying notes 178-88. 
171 See Trinko, 540 U.S. See also infra text accompanying notes 204-10. 
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elements. An essential facilities claim is established if (i) a 
monopolist controls a facility which (ii) a competitor is unable 
practically or reasonably to duplicate and (iii) use of the facility is 
denied to the claimant, even though (iv) it is feasible for the 
monopolist to provide access.
172
 In the past, essential facilities has 
been invoked to open up access to a railroad terminal,
173
 ski 
slopes,
174
 electricity delivery,
175
 news wire membership,
176
 and local 
telephone exchanges.
177
 
Two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions upholding 
lower court verdicts relying on the essential facilities doctrine were 
Otter Tail in 1973 and Aspen Skiing in 1985. In the first case, Otter 
Tail was a public utility that generated and sold electricity while 
simultaneously wielding a monopoly over the transmission of 
electricity.
178
 Otter Tail fought off attempts by municipalities to 
circumvent its lock on the retail market—for example, municipalities 
would buy electricity from other suppliers and ask Otter Tail to 
“wheel,” or transmit, the electricity over Otter Tail’s own power 
lines.
179
 The Department of Justice successfully sued Otter Tail for 
monopolization of the retail power market by using its dominant 
foothold in electricity transmission.
180
 In the second case, Aspen 
Skiing owned three of the four major downhill skiing facilities in 
Aspen, Colorado.
181
 For over a decade, Aspen Skiing or its corporate 
predecessors had collaborated in a joint venture with its rival Aspen 
Highlands, which owned the fourth major skiing facility.
182
 Yet in 
1977, Aspen Skiing terminated the joint venture, and Aspen 
Highlands sued successfully for monopolizing the market for 
downhill skiing services.
183
 
Curiously, the Supreme Court dodged the applicability of 
essential facilities in both Otter Tail and Aspen Skiing. This was 
despite the fact that the verdicts in both cases rested upon the 
doctrine.
184
 In Otter Tail, the Court’s analysis unfolded along 
 
172 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983). 
173 Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. 
174 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 
175 Otter Tail, 410 U.S. 
176 Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1945). 
177 Trinko, 540 U.S. 
178 410 U.S. at 368-71. 
179 Id. at 370-71. 
180 For a concise summary, see Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, 
Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1205-07 (1999). 
181 472 U.S. at 587-95. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. For a concise summary, see Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 180, at 1207-11. 
184 See United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D. Minn. 
1971) (“Pertinent to an examination of the law is a reference to . . . the 
‘bottleneck theory’ of antitrust law. This theory reflects in essence that it is an 
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straightforward monopolization terms, and in Aspen Skiing, the Court 
invoked alternative reasons for upholding the verdict, including the 
lack of a valid business justification for exclusion.
185
 The reluctance 
of the Court to confront the doctrine, even in an era that ushered in 
the “high-water mark” of essential facilities,186 is illustrative. 
Essential facilities is part of a broader duty to deal with rivals, whose 
violation is typically prosecuted as monopolization under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act. Yet the duty to deal stands on somewhat 
incoherent footing, since the refusal to collaborate is generally the 
prerogative of any business, even a monopolist’s. Further, even if 
sharing is mandated under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
collaboration that rises to the level of conspiracy run can afoul of 
Section 1.
187
 Not surprisingly, then, essential facilities has many 
prominent detractors, and even its supporters are measured in its 
application.
188
 
For our purposes, however, the applicability of essential 
facilities to FMIs is hardly farfetched, as two recent actions against 
bottlenecks in the financial markets demonstrate. In 1996, La Poste, 
the French post office, filed a complaint against SWIFT for refusing 
membership.
189
 This came at a time when essential facilities was 
rapidly gaining ground across the European Union.
190
 Shortly after 
 
illegal restraint of trade for a party to foreclose others from the use of a scarce 
facility.”); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d 1509 
(10th Cir. 1984). 
185 The Court noted that Aspen Skiing “was willing to sacrifice short-run 
benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact 
on its smaller rival.” 472 U.S. at 610-11. 
186 See Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 180, at 1206. 
187 See Maurer & Schotmer, supra note 20, at 3. 
188 See Philip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet In Need of Limiting 
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990) (seminal article decrying essential 
facilities), HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, at 246-48 (criticizing the doctrine even 
in the face of deregulation); Frischmann & Waller, supra note 23 (advocating 
revitalization of essential facilities only for certain infrastructures); Maurer &  
Scotchmer, supra note 20 (arguing for forced sharing only where synergies 
are enhanced). 
189 Case No IV/36.120 – La Poste/SWIFT + GUF, Notice 97/C335/03 (Nov. 
1997), OJ C335. 
190 See, e.g., Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverlag MgbH & Co KG and others, Case C-7/1997, [1998] ECR I-
07791. Oscar Bronner, La Poste, and other cases from the European Union are 
interesting counterpoints because the EU perspective begins with the 
supremacy of competition policy, which is enshrined in the European 
Community’s Treaty. As such, Europe’s financial reform regulations can only 
inform the essential facilities doctrine, rather than supplant it. See Pierre 
Larouche, Contrasting Legal Solutions and the Comparability of EU and US 
Experiences 18, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN THE EU AND US: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2009) 
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La Poste’s filing, the European Commission joined in, arguing that 
as the dominant international network transmitting payment 
messages, SWIFT was an essential facility—one which had abused 
its dominant position by imposing unjustified admission criteria.
191
 
Within a year, the case was settled when SWIFT promised to grant 
“full access . . . to any institution in the European Union which 
provides cross-border payment services to the public and fulfills the 
criteria laid down by the European Monetary Institute.”192 Such 
access was to be complete and nondiscriminatory.
193
 
More recently in the U.S., in July 2013, MF Global, the now-
defunct investment bank previously headed by Jon Corzine, sued 
several large swap dealers, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (a derivatives industry trade group), and Markit Group (a 
financial information services company) for conspiring to corner the 
market in credit default swaps by, among other things, restricting 
access to ICE Clear Credit, the dominant clearinghouse in the U.S. 
for these instruments.
194
 The complaint framed ICE Clear Credit as a 
bottleneck facility to which MF Global was unjustly denied access. 
That litigation is pending in the Northern District of Illinois. 
The challenge for claimants in the U.S., however, is that 
essential facilities has been consistently scaled back by the Supreme 
Court after Aspen Skiing. This movement culminated in the Court’s 
2004 decision in Trinko. In Trinko, the defendant was an incumbent 
local telephone service provider in New York City—one of the Baby 
Bells that, after a series of mergers, became Verizon.
195
 By an odd 
twist of history, the insurgent provider attempting to penetrate the 
New York City local telephone market was AT&T, the carrier of 
choice for claimant Curtis Trinko.
196
 Yet Verizon had denied AT&T 
access to Verizon’s local telephone networks.197 Hence, Trinko filed 
suit under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, claiming that Verizon failed 
to supply rivals with the necessary network connections to service 
customers of the rivals.
198
 The district court dismissed the claim for 
 
191 See id.; TURING, supra note 33, at § 7.9. 
192 Publication of an Undertaking Art. 1.1, Notice 97/C335/03 (Nov. 1997), OJ 
C335, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:C1997/335/03&from=EN [hereinafter 
SWIFT Undertaking]. The European Monetary Institute was the predecessor 
to the European Central Bank. TURING, supra note 33, at § 7.9. 
193 SWIFT Undertaking, supra note 192, at Arts. 1.2, 1.3. 
194 Complaint, MF Global Capital LLC v. Bank of America Corp., No. 1:13-cv-
5417 (N.D. Ill. 2013) [hereinafter MF Global Complaint]. 
195 540 U.S. at 402-05. 
196 Id. at 404-05. 
197 Id. at 403-05. 
198 Id. at 405. For an excellent summary, see Shelanski, supra note 23, at 693-
706. 
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failing to state an antitrust claim distinct from Verizon’s alleged 
violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which Trinko had 
no standing to enforce.
199
 The Second Circuit reversed; construing 
the pleadings liberally, the court proffered a number of independent 
antitrust theories under which the complaint could have stated a 
claim, including essential facilities and leveraging.
200
 When the 
Supreme Court took up the issue, the Court found that, given the 
pervasive federal regulatory framework, Trinko’s complaint failed to 
state a claim under the antitrust laws.
201
 Then the Court went further, 
denigrating the essential facilities doctrine in a portion of its dicta 
that would become one of the most frequently quoted passages from 
the case:  
 
This conclusion would be unchanged even if we 
considered to be established law the “essential 
facilities” doctrine crafted by some lower courts . . . 
We have never recognized such a doctrine, and we 
find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it 
here.
202
 
 
The Trinko majority’s dismissal of essential facilities is not 
ironclad. In the hundred years since the Supreme Court first crafted a 
sharing remedy in U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 
several decisions have imposed a duty upon a bottleneck to deal with 
rivals.
203
 
More controversially, Trinko summarily countermands the 
prior, well-established standard for resolving a conflict between 
regulation and antitrust where both frameworks exist. That was the 
“plain repugnancy” standard, developed in cases contemplating the 
place of antitrust in the face of securities regulation. The earlier cases 
on plain repugnancy strived for cohabitation of regulation and 
antitrust, precluding the latter only where regulation was clearly pre-
emptive.
204
 Later cases saw “plain repugnancy” evolve into simple 
“repugnancy,” whereby actual conflict is not needed for antitrust to 
 
199 Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 123 F. Supp .2d 
738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
200 305 F.3d 89, 108 (2d Cir. 2002). 
201 540 U.S. at 416. 
202 Id. at 410-11. Yet it is the passage’s conclusion that does far more damage: 
“The 1996 Act's extensive provision for access makes it unnecessary to 
impose a judicial doctrine of forced access. To the extent respondent's 
“essential facilities” argument is distinct from its general argument, we reject 
it.” Id. at 410-11. 
203 These include both Supreme Court decisions such as Otter Tail and Aspen 
Skiing, as well as lower court decisions such as MCI.  
204 See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). 
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defer—just the potential for conflict with regulation suffices for pre-
emption.
205
 In those cases, however, the regulations did not contain 
express antitrust savings clauses, so the Court was grappling with 
implied antitrust immunity.
206
 In Trinko, by contrast, the 
Telecommunications Act provided that “nothing in this Act . . . shall 
be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any 
of the antitrust laws,” a common antitrust savings clause.207 
Astonishingly, Trinko superimposed the repugnancy effect onto 
regulations where the intent of the drafters was to withhold antitrust 
immunity by conferring a savings clause.
208
 Henceforth, the calculus 
would not be whether potential conflict exists (often measured by the 
pervasiveness of the regulation) but whether antitrust adds anything 
at all (as measured by the costs of adding antitrust enforcement) if 
regulation has already spoken.
209
 Thus, after Trinko, it has been 
observed that “a little regulation can be a dangerous thing for 
competition enforcement in regulated industries.”210 
How can the two major trends identified in this Section be 
reconciled? On one hand, the great transformation of regulated 
industry has dismantled the age-old, if heavy-handed, mechanisms 
for checking the abuses of natural monopolies, replacing the filed 
rate doctrine with openness mandates. On the other hand, the dialing 
back of antitrust alternatives such as essential facilities and the 
concomitant expansion of antitrust immunity means that antitrust 
will not fill the recesses from deregulation.
211
 What, then, is the place 
of antitrust in regulated industries today, particularly if regulation is 
neither expansive nor clear? 
If the MF Global litigation portends anything, it is that 
financial market bottlenecks will set the stage for courts to answer 
the above questions.  
In MF Global, denial of access to a clearinghouse was 
alleged as the lynchpin for suppression of competition in the adjacent 
dealer market. The complaint tracked the elements of an essential 
facilities claim, but the plaintiffs’ attorneys refrained from 
 
205 See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
206 The most recent progeny of Silver and Gordon is Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) 
L.L.C. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007), where the majority saw the issue 
presented as one of repugnancy, id. at 267-68, even though under the facts the 
antitrust suit could not have conflicted with the securities laws, see Shelanski, 
supra note 23, at 709. 
207 540 U.S. at 406. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. at 413-15. 
210 Shelanski, supra note 23, at 702. 
211 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 335, 341 (2004) (“the natural result of deregulation is an increased 
role for the antitrust laws”). 
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classifying their claim as such. As their argument went, ICE Clear 
Credit was a facility essential to the sale of credit default swaps by 
virtue of the central clearing mandate; the facility was controlled by 
the largest sellers of credit default swaps.
212
 Due to strong economies 
of scale, the facility could not be duplicated.
213
 Its membership 
requirements had been set unreasonably high, even though risk could 
have been mitigated by less stringent standards.
214
 For example, ICE 
Clear Credit required members to have at least $5 billion in adjusted 
net capital.
215
 According to the complaint, “a flat $5 billion capital 
threshold keeps out independent dealers and end users, whose ability 
to clear CDS [credit default swaps] would enhance competition in 
the making of CDS markets and would thereby lower CDS 
spreads.”216  
Those “spreads” tracked the profitability of incumbent 
dealers; to keep the spreads wide, the defendants purportedly 
foreclosed competitors from the dealer market with an 
insurmountably high net capital requirement which kept them from 
joining the clearinghouse. In substance, the MF Global suit 
vindicated the academics and Justice Department attorneys who had 
warned that clearinghouses would enable incumbent dealers to 
foreclose competition from insurgents.
217
 
The MF Global suit is also provocative in its timing, coming 
a year after the finalization of the Eligibility Rule. The plaintiffs’ 
attorneys chose to pursue the private antitrust action notwithstanding 
the presence of regulation on open access.
218
 This was the same 
choice made by the plaintiff in Trinko—that is, to spell out an 
essential facilities action even though the Telecommunications Act 
provided a duty to deal in the form of interconnection to the 
monopolist’s telephone network. Yet Trinko suggests that an 
essential facilities claim will be rendered duplicative—and therefore 
dismissed—every time there is an openness mandate in regulation. It 
 
212 This would satisfy the first prong of essential facilities—control by a 
monopolist or, arguably, a cartel. 
213 This would satisfy the second prong of essential facilities—inability to 
duplicate. As MF Global further alleged, the defendants had also conspired to 
prevent the emergence of alternatives to ICE Clear Credit. See MF Global 
Complaint, supra note 194, at para. 89-112. 
214 This would satisfy the third and fourth prongs of essential facilities—
denial of access to a competitor despite the feasibility of providing access.  
215 MF Global Complaint, supra note 194, at para. 66. 
216 Id. at para. 68. 
217 See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 13; Christine A. Varney, Assist. Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Comments before the U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n, Washington, D.C., (Dec. 28, 2010); U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, supra note 66. 
218 Not surprisingly, MF Global included treble damages in its prayer for relief. 
MF Global Complaint, supra note 194, at para. 13. 
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is perhaps for this reason that MF Global never refers to essential 
facilities by name, opting instead to channel its spirit. 
MF Global therefore shows that there is a confluence of 
trends propelling clearinghouses toward the forefront in the battles 
over essential facilities and the relevance of antitrust. The next 
decisive step in these battles may come from litigation against these 
bottlenecks in the financial markets, where courts are forced to 
define the precise contours of open access. 
 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR RECONCILING OPENNESS MANDATES 
 
With Dodd-Frank’s Core Principle C and Eligibility Rule, 
lawmakers and financial regulators have imposed an openness 
mandate to solve age-old problems (leverage, foreclosure) in a novel 
setting (derivatives clearinghouses). This is an area where regulators 
have had little experience administering openness mandates. In the 
past, federal judges might have assisted with enforcement under the 
Sherman Act. Yet Trinko scales back the ability of courts to 
intervene where regulation has already spoken. 
This Section argues that essential facilities claims should be 
preserved as recourse against clearinghouses and their members for 
wrongful denial of access, notwithstanding the existence of Core 
Principle C and the Eligibility Rule. This proposal is a narrow one—
it merely argues for reconciliation of Dodd-Frank and essential 
facilities. However, given dicta in Trinko which undercuts both 
essential facilities as doctrine and the symbiosis of regulation and 
antitrust, this proposal must be hitched to broader arguments which 
refine, or even overhaul, Trinko. 
This Section begins with a formulation of the narrow 
proposal and discusses the justifications for, as well as opposition to, 
the proposal. This Section then explores the necessary steps to bring 
the proposal to fruition. 
 
A.   The Proposal 
 
An openness mandate allows excluded applicants to a 
financial market bottleneck to challenge the denial of access. This is 
an easy proposition if competition laws are the only framework for 
deterring the abuses of bottlenecks. But if there are also regulations 
on point, then the proposition must be refined, and additional 
justifications must be proffered for supplementing those regulations. 
As applied to clearinghouses, then, this proposal can be 
restated as follows: Permit the coexistence of the essential facilities 
doctrine and the Eligibility Rule, so that excluded applicants to 
clearinghouses can bring private antitrust actions. 
How might this proposal be applied? 
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If an applicant (say, a small derivatives dealer) applies to a 
clearinghouse for membership and is denied, the applicant might 
initiate a regulatory proceeding with the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”) against the clearinghouse. If successful, such 
a proceeding may result in either a fine to the clearinghouse or 
deregistration of the clearinghouse.
219
 Neither possibility is very 
useful to the excluded applicant, who merely wants access to satisfy 
Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandate and who likely cannot afford the 
sunk costs of building a clearinghouse of its own. 
Simultaneously, however, the applicant could also pursue a 
private right of action against the clearinghouse and its members for 
denial of access to an essential facility. If successful, the remedy 
might be forced sharing, which enables the applicant to continue 
with its core function of selling derivatives; or the remedy might be 
damages, which either compensates for the additional costs of having 
to find a surrogate to satisfy the clearing mandate
220
 or forces the 
clearinghouse to the negotiation table to talk seriously about granting 
access.
221
 
 
B.   Arguing the Proposal 
 
1.   Complementing (versus duplicating) regulation 
 
For clearinghouses, an antitrust openness mandate is well-
suited to complement the regulatory one. Regulators face an uphill 
battle in patrolling and effectively remedying the duty of open, 
nondiscriminatory access. The only tool in their arsenal is the 
Eligibility Rule, a nebulous formulation which leaves much 
discretion to the regulated entities themselves. The remedy, too, is 
inappropriate, providing only for fines and deregistration.  
The complementary nature of the Eligibility Rule and 
essential facilities can be shown through a comparison of their 
elements. The rule and the doctrine neither duplicate each other 
entirely nor avoid overlap altogether; instead, combining the two 
leads to more holistic enforcement of the openness mandate. 
To begin with, there are elements of each mandate that can be 
found in the other. Most importantly, the freedom of a clearinghouse 
to balance risk under the Eligibility Rule is mirrored in essential 
facility’s inquiry into “feasibility” of access in prong iv.222 In an 
essential facilities action, a clearinghouse must demonstrate why 
admission of an applicant was infeasible; no doubt the applicant’s 
 
219  See 7 U.S.C. § 8(b); 17 C.F.R. § 143.8. 
220 This can be done by entering into another trade with a clearinghouse 
member. However, the additional transaction incurs additional fees. 
221 See Crane, supra note 164, at 707-09. 
222 See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text. 
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risk profile would figure prominently in the clearinghouse’s 
argument. 
Yet the two mandates also bear unique traits. The Eligibility 
Rule, understandably, features some detailed requirements which 
adhere to a degree of specificity that is common for regulations but 
not found in generalist antitrust doctrines. For instance, 
clearinghouses cannot peg admission criteria to an applicant being a 
derivatives dealer or hitting a certain notional threshold.
223
 For its 
part, prong ii of essential facilities looks to the ease of duplication of 
a clearinghouse,
224
 an inquiry absent in the regulatory counterpart. 
Historically, this inquiry has been more the province of antitrust 
enforcers than financial regulators; it introduces valid questions of 
whether the applicant could or should just form its own 
clearinghouse.
225
 Essential facilities would also subsume the 
balancing of access and risk into a broader analysis of 
“feasibility.”226 This approach might suggest ways of getting from 
denial of access to granting of access. An applicant whose initial risk 
profile militates toward denial might be rehabilitated so that it could 
eventually be granted access. For instance, the clearinghouse might 
give the applicant pointers on shoring up its risk mitigation 
procedures. This flexibility would be provided for—even required—
in the element of “feasibility.”227 
There are also institutional benefits that flow from letting the 
two openness mandates work together. Essential facilities brings 
along a century of precedent that has built up institutional familiarity 
with the harms of denial of access, as well as experimentation with 
different types of remedies. The record on deterrence has been 
 
223 17 C.F.R. 39.12(a)(1)(v). 
224 MCI Commc’ns Corp., 708 F.2d at1132-33. 
225 Also associated with this is the complex question of whether open access 
deters the DCO’s incentives to innovate. In general antitrust circles, the effects 
of a robust duty to deal upon innovation are hotly contested. See Frischmann 
& Waller, supra note 23, at 32; Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 180, at 1239-40. See 
also The Uncertain Future of the Internet: Hearing before the H. Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce (Feb. 15, 2015) (memo from Majority Committee Staff), 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20150225/103018/HHRG-114-
IF16-20150225-SD002-U1.pdf. 
226 “Feasibility” is the fourth element of essential facilities. See MCI Commc’ns 
Corp., 708 F.2d at1132-33. 
227 Note, however, that even the MCI court was unable to apply the feasibility 
element and, instead, threw up its hands and deferred to regulators. See 
Maurer & Schotmer, supra note 20, at 15. This Article’s proposal runs the risk 
of the same happening. To prevent this, courts must apply their own analysis 
on feasibility rather than repeating how the Eligibility Rule balances access 
against risk. 
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mixed,
228
 but it is a record that can help steer regulators toward more 
flexible detection of anticompetitive effects as well as solutions for 
such effects. For the massive, yet newly mandated derivatives 
clearing industrial complex, essential facilities may also spur 
rigorous examination of problems that financial regulators have 
heretofore been unable to address—most prominently, concentration 
in the derivatives dealer markets.
229
 
Coexistence with antitrust improves not only the tools but 
also the institutions of oversight. Among the notable advantages of 
antitrust over regulation is a diminished likelihood of capture.
230
 The 
too-big-to-fail nature of systemically significant clearinghouses 
necessitates a close relationship with financial regulators, which in 
turn makes them prone to regulatory capture.
231
 Without proper 
institutional checks, the regulations designed to restrain 
clearinghouses might morph into restraints against their 
competitors.
232
 
Of course, imposing an antitrust openness mandate introduces 
complications of its own. Prong i in an essential facilities action, 
control of a facility by a monopolist, presents an inquiry that the 
Eligibility Rule avoids. Satisfying this prong would necessitate 
finding that a small group of dealer-members not only controls a 
clearinghouse but adequately constitutes a “monopolist.”233 Yet 
group action is typically governed under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, while single-firm conduct falls under Section 2’s prohibition 
against monopolization.
234
 This oddity replicates the conflation of 
 
228 See, e.g., Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 180, at 1195–96 (discussing the 
difficulty of crafting the appropriate remedy in Terminal Railroad). 
229 For instance, judicial scrutiny into the reasonableness of denial of access 
and forcing the excluded applicant to build its own facility might push the 
industry toward consensus on the grounds for exclusion. This has happened 
where licensing is heavily utilized: the industry settles upon a norm, and 
antitrust checks those norms for anticompetitive effects. See Frischmann & 
Waller, supra note 23, at 38-39. 
230 For an exploration of regulatory capture in the promulgation of telecom 
interconnection mandates, see Candeub, supra note 23, at 860 (detailing how 
the Baby Bells sought regulation by the Federal Communications Commission 
under the belief that the regulator was more lax than antitrust prosecutors). 
231 See Lubben, supra note 99 (arguing that it is unimaginable for large 
clearinghouses to fail without being bailed out). 
232 See Crane, supra note 164, at 707 (quoting Alfred Kahn on regulation’s 
contradictory impulses toward monopoly). 
233 But see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 336 (2011) at 336 (“once a properly defined 
‘essential facility’ is at issue, it really should not matter whether the facility is 
controlled by a single firm or a group of firms acting in concert”). 
234 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. For a thorough discussion, see Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion 
as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 532-35 (2013). 
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sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act that has muddled the essential 
facilities doctrine and inspired its detractors.
235
 More complicated 
still is the prospect that to fully tease out concerted action by dealer-
members, we have to turn to debates around parallel exclusion,
236
 as 
well as collusion versus exclusion,
237
 which is more controversy than 
we have room to take on here. 
Let us not lose sight of the bigger picture, however. For all 
the ancillary debates that essential facilities entails, those debates are 
fresh ways of looking at the problem of FMIs as a node of vertical 
integration, particularly the integration of the derivatives dealer 
market with the derivatives clearing market. Coexistence with 
antitrust would lend these perspectives, as well as a wealth of 
experience in crafting remedies. 
 
2.   Undercutting risk management 
 
A powerful counterargument, however, is that paring a 
regulatory openness mandate with essential facilities undercuts the 
ability of a clearinghouse to manage risk. Because a denied applicant 
could pursue a private right of action, the clearinghouse must now 
contemplate antitrust when making eligibility determinations. 
This concern is backed by valid considerations. After all, 
regulators settled upon a rule that they felt appropriately balances the 
diametric interests—balance which might be upset if an antitrust 
claim is in the mix.
238
 If small traders force their way into a 
clearinghouse by way of open access, then the other members and 
the clearinghouse itself might be imperiled. 
To some extent, however, the mechanics of a properly 
functioning clearinghouse mitigates those perils. For example, 
collateral requirements should prevent trades from becoming highly 
leveraged. Even if trades by smaller members were not adequate 
collateralized, the default fund should stave off exposure to other 
members.
239
 
Here is another way to conceptualize what is at stake: The 
fallout of admitting smaller members might be that some of them 
default and other members are called upon to augment the default 
fund.
240
 On the other hand, the fallout of preserving the status quo, 
 
235 See infra note 187-88 and accompanying text. 
236 See Hemphill & Wu, supra note 67. 
237 See Baker, supra note 234. 
238 See DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69352. Ultimately, it is not the 
province of regulators to determine how regulation squares with antitrust; 
this is a decision for lawmakers and the courts. 
239 For a much heralded example of the default fund at work, see de Terán, 
supra note 79; LCH.Clearnet, supra note 79. 
240 See Lubben, supra note 99, at 10-11. 
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where dominant derivatives dealers have a lock on clearinghouses, is 
that risk will not be properly dispersed. Thus, if a large dealer 
defaults, the damage cannot be dissipated.
241
 Concentration in the 
dealer market was the norm prior to the financial crisis, and it 
remains the norm today;
242
 Dodd-Frank has simply interposed the 
additional layer of clearinghouses, which, ironically, works to 
cement the status quo. 
One way to interpret the centralization of clearinghouse 
membership among a small group of dominant dealers is that the 
clearinghouses have successfully weeded out risky applicants. The 
other way to read this is Tirole’s: that the clearinghouse membership 
profile replicates and reinforces concentration in the downstream 
dealer market.
243
 The latter interpretation is backed by not just 
theory, but also evidence from other vertically integrated 
industries.
244
  
Of course, the derivatives clearing industry may be different 
enough that financial regulators should have the exclusive say on 
how competition policy fits. Certainly there are traits unique to this 
industry, whose prerogative to manage financial risk has implications 
not only for competition, but also for the stability of the global 
economy. Many balancing acts are at work in Dodd-Frank’s 
openness mandate. Admittedly, it may be too early to discern the 
proper balance between access and risk—we may need more time to 
see how the clearing market (and, by implication, the adjacent 
trading market) evolves.
245
 This Article merely suggests that it would 
 
241 See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 77, at 47-48: 
 
The problem with the clearinghouse is not when your 
smallest clearing member fails. The problem with the 
clearinghouse is when your highly interconnected, large 
[clearinghouses fail] . . . . So, the notion somehow that you 
should restrict arbitrarily membership to a clearinghouse 
such that you have more connected, larger, systemically 
important institutions who are highly correlated is patently 
wrong. (comments of Jason Kastner) 
 
In theory, clearinghouse mechanics should take care of this risk, as the CFTC 
requires clearinghouses to be sufficiently capitalized to withstand the default 
of its largest one or two members. See 17 C.F.R. § 39.29. In practice, however, 
many are skeptical that if the largest members fall, the clearinghouse will still 
be able to stand. See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 99. 
242 See supra text accompanying notes 151-53. 
243 See supra notes 44, 83. 
244 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 97 (futures exchanges); Crawford, 
supra note 94 (telecommunications). 
245 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Statement of the Commission 12 
(Mar. 6, 2013), available at 
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be foolhardy to bide the time by leaving the dominant derivatives 
dealers to their anticompetitive devices. 
 
3.   Perverse incentives for derivatives users 
 
Another powerful counterargument is that perverse incentives 
would be created for consumers of derivatives—end-users, hedgers, 
and even speculators—if these clearinghouses submit to regulatory 
and antitrust openness mandates. Open-access clearing ostensibly 
results in competition in the dealer market. Competition in the dealer 
market, in turn, lowers prices for derivatives instruments.
246
 
In other paradigms, lower price coheres with consumer 
welfare, the driving justification for breaking up monopolies.
247
 
Consumer welfare is gauged by increased consumption, particularly 
of a resource made either artificially scarce or artificially expensive 
by a monopoly.
248
  
For derivatives, however, the calculus is different. The 
resource being consumed is a financial instrument with complex, 
often hidden risks
249
 that has been maligned as “financial weapons of 
mass destruction.”250 Lower prices for derivatives means greater 
consumption—usually by two types of “consumers.”251 One type is 
consumers who might not need derivatives or understand their risks. 
Yet they might be induced to purchase if the prices are not 
 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6525-13 (follow link to 
“Statement of the Commission”) (approving Rule 1001 in CME’s Rulebook but 
noting that the rule’s anticompetitive effects may not manifest until some time 
has passed). The controversy over CME Rule 1001 is one of the most 
interesting developments in recent months. The rule permits CME’s 
clearinghouse to report data on cleared swaps to its vertically integrated swap 
data repository. The controversy has revealed how the CFTC handles 
complaints against a large clearinghouse alleging violations of Core Principle 
N (antitrust considerations). 
246 See Erik Gerding, Derivatives: Learning to love anti-competitive behavior?, 
THE CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2013/08/derivatives-learning-to-love-
anti-competitive-behavior.html. 
247 BERG & TSCHIRHART, supra note 58, at 24-30, 288-89. See also John B. 
Kirkwood and Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting 
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, (2008). 
248 See SULLIVAN GRIMES, supra note 58. 
249 See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 337-73. 
250 Warren E. Buffett, Letter the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 13 
(Feb. 21, 2003), available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf. 
251 See FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL STREET (2010) 
(characterizing buyers of derivatives as either “cheaters” or “widows and 
orphans”). 
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prohibitive.
252
 Another type is consumers who trade derivatives for 
purely speculative purposes.
253
 They might be induced to double 
down on their positions if the instruments are cheap enough. 
Some of these risks can be averted by other provisions in 
Dodd-Frank. Purchase of derivatives by certain consumers—for 
example, government entities and pension plans—triggers certain 
duties among dealers, including the requirement to place the 
purchasers’ interests above the dealers’ interests.254 These duties 
should mitigate risks to some consumers. 
Further, the clearing function itself works to reduce risk by 
standardizing derivatives instruments.
255
 Clearing demands that 
instruments be fungible enough so that if one party to a trade 
defaults, an unrelated party can buy into that position.
256
 Fungibility 
reduces information asymmetries, increases transparency in pricing, 
and thereby dampens risk.
257
 
A related argument is that natural monopoly regulation is an 
improper theoretical framework for clearinghouses because these 
facilities do not interface with the public interest. The foundational 
works on natural monopolies justified their regulation on the bases of 
sunk costs and public goods.
258
 That is, natural monopolies must 
provide useful services such as electricity that cannot be widely 
 
252 The inducement might come via tying—for example, a lender only extends 
a loan if the borrower also purchases an interest rate swap. See Felix B. Chang, 
Death to Credit as Leverage: Using the Bank Anti-Tying Provision to Curb 
Financial Risk, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 851 (2013). 
253 See Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely 
Speculative Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 67 (2011). 
254 See 17 C.F.R. 23.400 et seq.; Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers 
and Major Swap Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734 (Feb. 17, 
2012). 
255 Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, 
Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks through a Central 
Counterparty 10 (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340660. 
256 Id. See also DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69361 (“The Commission 
believes that standardizing products . . . will increase liquidity, lower prices, 
and increase participation. In addition, standardized products should make it 
easier for members to accept a forced allocation in the event of bankruptcy.”). 
257 See generally Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory 
and Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55 (2011). The counterargument to this is 
that innovation, and therefore risk, will migrate elsewhere. For example, 
clearinghouses might choose to keep certain instruments unclearable so as to 
maximize the dealer’s cut; or financial institutions might devise new 
instruments not encapsulated by mandatory clearing. Risk does not diminish 
but is pushed elsewhere. But standardized instruments are not free of risk. 
The speculation in silver futures in the 1980s shows that fungible, exchange-
traded instruments too can wreak havoc. 
258 See SPULBER, supra note 58, at 4. 
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dispensed without government protection from competition.
259
 
Whether centrally cleared derivatives are a public good is far from 
settled. Derivatives might be widely consumed at staggering 
volumes, but they are often lambasted as little more than gambling. 
If the clearing grid makes it easier to transact in instruments so 
closely associated with financial crises,
260
 its value may be dubious. 
 
4.   Expansiveness of regulation 
 
The proposal to pair essential facilities with the Eligibility 
Rule can be justified within the existing framework of regulatory 
pre-emption of antitrust. While Dodd-Frank as a whole is expansive, 
its pronouncements on competition are sparse, consisting only of 
Core Principles C and N, the antitrust savings clause, and the 
Eligibility Rule.
261
 The lean regulatory framework on competition 
suggests that antitrust is not to be displaced. 
Prior to Trinko, Supreme Court precedent on antitrust 
immunity looked either to the expansiveness of the regulatory 
scheme or to the potential for conflict between regulation and 
antitrust.
262
 Neither approach was overruled by Trinko.
263
 Rather, 
Trinko pivots toward comparing the costs and benefits of antitrust if 
regulation already exists.
264
 Thus, there are three ways of considering 
regulatory pre-emption of antitrust: (i) pervasiveness of regulation, 
(ii) potential for conflict, and (iii) additional benefits conveyed by 
antitrust.  
Regarding the first possibility, as noted above, Dodd-Frank’s 
provisions on competition are hardly pervasive. The Eligibility Rule 
is a far cry from the “extensive provision for access” under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that the Supreme Court invoked to 
justify its refusal to sanction judicially imposed access.
265
 Three 
years after Trinko, the Supreme Court decided Credit Suisse v. 
Billing, which provided four factors to determine whether regulation 
 
259 See id.  
260 FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE 
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2009) (Orange County, California and Procter & Gamble 
interest rate swaps debacles); Kyle Whitmire & Mary Williams Walsh, High 
Finance Backfires on Alabama County, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/business/12bama.html?_r=1&fta=y 
(Jefferson County, Alabama interest rate swaps debacle). 
261 Trinko itself points to the “existence of a regulatory structure designed to 
deter and remedy anticompetitive harm,” 540 U.S. at 412 (emphasis added), 
rather than the expansiveness of the entire regulation. 
262 E.g., Silver, 373 U.S.; U.S. v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), Inc., 
422 U.S. 694 (1975). 
263 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (citing Silver and NASD with approval). 
264 See id. at 411-12 (citing Silver to support this approach). 
265 Id. at 411. 
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should trump antitrust: (i) the existence of regulatory authority to 
supervise the conduct in question, (ii) evidence that regulators 
exercise that authority, (iii) the risk of conflicting results from 
applying antitrust, and (iv) whether the conduct falls within the 
activities governed by regulation.
266
 Credit Suisse saw itself as 
following prior implied antitrust immunity cases premised upon the 
pervasiveness of the securities laws.
267
 Hence, these four factors can 
help parse whether the Eligibility Rule too is sufficiently 
“pervasive.” Here the Eligibility Rule falls short. Despite the 
existence of regulation on point (factors i and iv), the persistence of 
questionable clearinghouse membership requirements and 
concentration in the dealer markets
268
 is evidence suggesting that 
regulators have not exercised their authority (factor ii).
269
 
Regarding the second possibility for construing pre-emption 
(the potential for conflict), it must be conceded that the 
complementary relationship between the Eligibility Rule and 
essential facilities could, in some circumstances, lead to disparate 
findings. For instance, the CFTC might not challenge a 
clearinghouse’s exclusion of an applicant, but the applicant could 
turn to federal court, file an action against the clearinghouse under 
antitrust laws, and prevail. This would be the nightmare scenario that 
motivates the critics of a parallel private right of action under 
antitrust law. Such critics fear that antitrust would engender false 
positives
270
 and cumulative overdeterrence,
271
 as well as invade the 
purview of regulators.
272
 
Nonetheless, we can accept a result of inconsistency if it 
stems from the inability of the CFTC to enforce the Eligibility 
Rule.
273
 In that case, antitrust would stave off the false negatives of 
underenforcement.
274
 There can also be no overdeterrence if 
regulators do not deter in the first place.  
We can also accept inconsistency if it furthers the CFTC’s 
mandate under the Eligibility Rule. Indeed, in the final release 
announcing the promulgation of the rule, the CFTC noted that “[t]he 
 
266 See 551 U.S. at 275-76. For critics of Trinko, Credit Suisse is no les 
problematic in its approach toward antitrust immunity. See Shelanski, supra 
note 23, at 706-10. 
267 551 U.S. at 275-76 (citing Gordon and NASD). 
268 See supra Section III.B.2. 
269 Factor iii from Credit Suisse, the potential for conflict between regulation 
and antitrust, is discussed in the next paragraph. 
270 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412-14. 
271 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 164, at 705 n.88 and accompanying text. 
272 For a nuanced analysis, see Glover, supra note 162, at 1180 (discussing 
when regulators possess informational advantages). 
273 See id. at 1203-04. 
274 Shelanski, supra note 23, at 711-13. 
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Commission has crafted the provisions of § 39.12 . . . to establish a 
regulatory framework that it believes can ensure that a DCO’s 
participation requirements do not unreasonably restrict any entity 
from becoming a clearing member while, at the same time, limiting 
risk to the DCO and its clearing members.”275 And yet, in the very 
next sentence, the release clarified that “The Commission expects 
that more widespread participation will reduce the concentration of 
clearing member portfolios, thereby diversifying risk, increasing 
market liquidity, and increasing competition among clearing 
members.”276 That is, competition in the dealer market, too, is a goal 
of the rule. Unfortunately, the rule that the agency arrived at is a 
weak mechanism for ensuring competition, one that would work well 
in tandem with antitrust. The elements of essential facilities could 
undertake broader contemplation of vertical exclusion, the ability to 
replicate a clearinghouse, and competition in the adjacent dealer 
market. 
At its most benign, then, a contradictory result might be 
traced to the weakness of the Eligibility Rule or the difficulty of 
catching an infraction—glitches which can be backstopped by a 
private right of action. Of course, at its most destructive, a false 
positive under antitrust might force a clearinghouse to expose itself 
to excessive risk. Recent scholarship has advanced a number of 
findings that temper the reality of false positives,
277
 thereby making 
this tradeoff more palatable. 
Regarding the third possibility for construing pre-emption 
(additional benefits from antitrust), there is much that a resuscitated 
essential facilities doctrine can offer alongside the Eligibility Rule. 
Among other things, antitrust would lend novel perspectives on 
looking at the harms of leverage and foreclosure, which the CFTC is 
not accustomed to dealing with. 
 
5.   Antitrust savings clause 
 
Core Principle N and the antitrust savings clause reflect clear 
Congressional intent to sustain the applicability of antitrust law. In 
fact, Dodd-Frank’s rather slim competition-related provisions should 
settle the convoluted wrangling over whether regulation is 
sufficiently expansive to displace antitrust. The majority of cases on 
antitrust immunity actually involve implied immunity, where the 
statute on point does not have an antitrust savings clause or a savings 
clause that refers explicitly to the antitrust laws.
278
 Here, Dodd-Frank 
 
275 DCO Core Principles, supra note 82, at 69352. 
276 Id. 
277 E.g., Shelanski, supra note 23, at 711-13. 
278 See Silver, 373 U.S.; Gordon, 422 U.S.; and Credit Suisse, 551 U.S.  
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contains such a savings clause, and while the clause does not 
necessarily operate to bar any finding of plain repugnancy,
279
 the 
existence of such a clause should nudge courts toward trying harder 
to reconcile antitrust with regulation. 
The backdrop of how Dodd-Frank’s antitrust savings clause 
came to pass is salient. Prior to Dodd-Frank, the restriction on 
imposing a material anticompetitive burden had been limited to 
designated contract markets (“DCMs”).280 DCMs are platforms such 
as exchanges and boards of trade which quote the trading prices of 
futures or options contracts.
281
 DCMs have existed for over a 
century; prominent ones include the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(“CME”) and the Chicago Board of Trade.282 In the academic 
discipline of industrial organization, some DCMs have become 
synonymous with inefficiency and abuse of dominance.
283
 This is 
because many run their own clearinghouses. For instance, CME 
dominates the market for selling certain treasury futures.
284
 CME’s 
proprietary clearinghouse, known as CME Clearing, only clears and 
settles products sold by CME the futures dealer.
285
 If an upstart 
wanted to sell the same types of agricultural futures, it would have to 
go to another clearinghouse or form its own.
286
 
Prior to Dodd-Frank, the antitrust considerations of Core 
Principle N governed only DCMs. Then in 2010, Section 725 of 
Dodd-Frank extended this principle to clearinghouses. The extension 
reflects a commitment from Dodd-Frank’s drafters to protect 
competition. Against the backdrop of vertical foreclosure in the 
futures industry and now clearinghouses for over-the-counter 
derivatives, the antitrust savings clause appears all the more 
compelling. 
 
 
 
 
279 Shelanski, supra note 23, at 693 (analyzing the Second Circuit decision in 
Trinko, which advocated such a position). 
280 See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated Contract 
Markets, 77 Fed. Reg. 36612, 36657 (June 19, 2012). 
281 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Designated Contract Markets 
(DCMs), 
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/index.
htm (last accessed Feb. 26, 2015). 
282 See CFTC, Trading Organizations - Designated Contract Markets (DCMs), 
http://sirt.cftc.gov/SIRT/SIRT.aspx?Topic=TradingOrganizations&implicit=tr
ue&type=DCM&CustomColumnDisplay=TTTTTTTT (last accessed Feb. 26, 
2015). 
283 See, e.g., Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 97, at 313. 
284 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 66, at 10-16. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
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6.   Established nature of the antitrust openness mandate 
 
Control of a bottleneck facility in an upstream market helps 
the monopolist in a downstream market maintain its dominance. This 
is a classic case of leveraging that fits within the caveat that Trinko 
left open for causes of action under “existing antitrust standards.”287 
As a matter of doctrine, leveraging is a form of exclusion, 
whose rules have long been controversial in competition policy.
288
 
The detractors of exclusion have been many and prominent.
289
 The 
various tropes of exclusion, from tying to leverage to margin 
squeeze, have alternately fallen into and out of favor, with the latest 
volley coming from Rey and Tirole—and, in 2014, vindication of 
their view by Tirole’s Nobel Prize. 
As a matter of history, the lineage of exclusion is long and 
storied. For all the fluctuations in academic trends, exclusion fits 
squarely within existing antitrust standards.
290
 The seminal case on 
essential facilities, Terminal Railroad, recently celebrated its 100
th
 
birthday, and it was not that long ago that the high-water-mark of 
this doctrine was reached in Otter Tail and Aspen Skiing. 
Yet characterizing essential facilities as an “established” 
cause of action runs up against Trinko. The majority in Trinko 
minced no words in its skepticism toward monopolization and duty-
to-deal claims.  The majority characterized the duty-to-deal 
precedent as “at or near the outer boundary of [Sherman Act] § 2 
liability”;291  then it proceeded to dismantle Aspen by reading it as 
imposing several high bars for plaintiffs.
292
 In the few paragraphs 
between the decision’s two frequently quoted passages on essential 
 
287 See 540 U.S. at 407 (“just as the 1996 Act preserves claims that satisfy 
existing antitrust standards, it does not create new claims that go beyond 
existing antitrust standards.”). 
288 Baker, supra note 234, at 534-35. 
289 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
290 One might take issue with Trinko’s insistence on existing antitrust 
standards; for it freezes antitrust law in 2004, preventing new doctrines from 
ever evolving. But for our purposes, the more modest approach of trying to fit 
leveraging claims against clearinghouses within Trinko’s precepts suffices. 
291 540 U.S. at 409. 
292 Trinko appears to require (i) a pre-existing course of dealing prior to 
exclusion and (ii) sacrificing of short-term profits for long-term dreams of 
monopoly. See Eleanor M. Fox, Is There Life in Aspen after Trinko? The Silent 
Revolution of Section 2 under the Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 153, 167 
(2005).  
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facilities,
293
 the Court all but obliterated the doctrine, articulating a 
test that Aspen’s own facts could not have passed.294  
In the end, all justifications for the essential facilities doctrine 
must come to a head by confronting Trinko. 
 
C.   Broader Arguments to Refine Trinko 
 
This Article calls for utilizing antitrust to shore up the 
regulatory openness mandate. Yet this cannot be done without 
rethinking Trinko. Trinko blocks the coexistence of Dodd-Frank and 
essential facilities at every turn. Under the majority opinion, antitrust 
can hardly complement regulation if regulation has already spoken, 
and essential facilities has been whittled to a shred of its former self 
under Aspen. In so starkly cabining the prior antitrust frameworks, 
Trinko itself must be cabined if the proposal herein is to come to 
pass. 
A number of critics have advanced arguments for dealing 
with Trinko.
295
 There are, therefore, several possibilities to choose 
from. This Subsection summarizes a few of them, tailoring the 
application to clearinghouses. 
One set of possibilities is to more clearly demarcate the 
realms of regulation and antitrust, as well as the permissible 
overlaps. This might be achieved by defaulting to courts to read 
Trinko narrowly. To this end, courts could require that regulation 
truly be expansive, as well as precise, in its contemplation of 
competition in order to displace antitrust. This alternative has been 
explored here and also by Howard Shelanski.
296
 Its drawback is that 
implementation rests the lower courts, which could read “expansive” 
divergently, eventually requiring the Supreme Court to step in 
again.
297
 But that is not a bad result, as it would force the Supreme 
Court to reconsider rather problematic precedent.
298
 
Another set of possibilities is to revitalize essential facilities 
directly. Brett Frischmann and Spencer Waller, for instance, have 
 
293 Specifically, that “Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 
liability,” 540 U.S. at 409, and that the Court has “never recognized such a 
doctrine,” id. at 410. 
294 See Fox, supra note 292, at 162-67. 
295 See infra text accompanying notes 296-302. 
296 See Shelanski, supra note 23, at 730. 
297 Id. Alternatively, as Shelanski has also suggested, Congress could step in to 
establish clearer standards for antitrust immunity. Id. at 730-31. 
298 The post-Trinko cases suggest that the current state of affairs is a morass. 
See Robert A. Skitol, Three Years after Verizon v. Trinko: Broad Dissatisfaction 
with the Whole Thrust of Refusal to Deal Law, 6-APR ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 
(2007); Sandeep Vaheesan, Reviving an Epithet: A New Way Forward for the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 911 (2010). 
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defended the use of essential facilities to open up access to certain 
infrastructures if the infrastructures create social value when utilized 
productively in the downstream market.
299
 This is a variation of an 
older argument that access to public goods should be granted in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.
300
 Spencer and Waller’s infrastructure 
theory is not particularly controversial for hard infrastructures, 
which, traditionally, essential facilities have tended to be (e.g., roads, 
bridges, connections to the local telephone network). Clearinghouses 
are less physically tangible, though the upside is that they are not as 
prone to capacity problems. As applied to derivatives products, 
infrastructure theory also leads to interesting conversations about the 
social value of derivatives, which is not universally accepted. 
More recently, essential facilities has been reimagined as a 
tool for creating synergies among the entities sharing access, so that 
consumer value is enhanced and costs reduced.
301
 The peculiarities 
of the derivatives markets obviate some of the problems that come 
with the synergy theory—for example, sharing should not be 
encouraged if it would lead to congestion of the facility, a concern 
that is likely irrelevant for clearinghouses. But those peculiarities 
also raise additional considerations, such as the incentives upon 
consumers of derivatives if those products are less costly and more 
widely available.
302
 
A constant thread that runs through most of these options is 
the need to bolster essential facilities—to defend it from the 
onslaught of Trinko and bring it back from the brink of extinction. 
Some advocates have proffered an approach by Judge Posner as a 
measured way of resuscitating essential facilities. In Olympia 
Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
303
 decided 
nearly two decades before Trinko, Posner focused on whether refusal 
to cooperate hurts competition because access to necessary facilities 
is denied.
304
 For derivatives clearinghouses, the answer is a yes: the 
central clearing mandate renders clearinghouses necessary, and 
 
299 See Frischmann and Waller, supra note 23, at 14. Infrastructure theory is 
comprised of three conditions: (i) the infrastructure-resource may be 
consumed non-rivalrously, (ii) social demand for the resource is driven 
primarily by downstream productive activity that requires the input of the 
resource, and (iii) the resource is an input into a wide range of goods and 
services. Id. at 12. This theory surfaced in earlier form in Waller’s challenge of 
Areeda’s conception of essential facilities. See Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda, 
Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 359 (2008). 
300 See Speta, supra note 90; Crawford, supra note 94. 
301 See Maurer & Schotmer, supra note 20, at 4. For the elements of their 
theory, see id. at 26. 
302 See supra Section IV.B.3. 
303 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986). 
304 See id. at 377; Skitol, supra note 298, at 9-10. This is in contrast with the 
hurdles imposed upon Aspen. See supra note 291. 
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denial of access hurts competition in the largest financial markets in 
the world. Even a modest revival of essential facilities by way of 
Posner’s approach would go a long way toward leveling the playing 
field in those markets. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The stakes are high for safeguarding open access to 
derivatives clearinghouses, a type of financial market infrastructure 
that sits at the intersection of several major trends. If financial 
regulators fail to catch improper denials of access, the consequence 
isn’t simply that traders do not gain access to clearinghouses or the 
dealer market is not as diverse—the consequence is also that the 
derivatives markets continue to be concentrated in a small number of 
systemically significant financial institutions. Today, several 
financial markets exhibit a high degree of concentration, with the 
vast majority of market share typically being taken up by the same 
entities. The top derivatives dealers, for example, also happen to be 
the largest commercial banks and the most powerful clearinghouse 
members. For all the reforms in Dodd-Frank, the act does little to 
dissipate the concentration in the dealer market. 
The only tool that regulators have is the Eligibility Rule, a 
relatively new rule whose effectiveness depends on the discretion of 
the regulated clearinghouses. If, by way of essential facilities actions, 
competitors in the much more lucrative dealer market are permitted 
to also check the exclusionary impulses of the dominant dealers and 
their naturally monopolistic clearinghouses, then essential facilities 
and the Eligibility Rule would have gone further than any 
combination of financial regulation and antitrust before it. By 
Trinko’s own cost-benefit analysis, the coexistence of antitrust and 
regulation would be justified. 
